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RECENT DECISIONS
CONTRATS-CO-NsiDERATION--CHAITABLE SuBscsRPTIoNS.-A claim arising from
a subscription, was filed against the insolvent estate. The subscription instrument
directed the decedent's executors to pay the claimants one thousand dollars out of his
estate, for the purpose of raising a scholarship endowment fund. The money was
payable one day after the death of his wife, if she survived him. Endorsed on the
back of the instrument was a provision that the money should be used for a scholar-
ship to be named after the donor and his wife. It is alleged that in reliance on
the subscription, the donee proceeded with the erection of a building. Held, that
the promise to make a gift in the future was unsupported by any consideration and
unenforceable against the testator's estate, since neither party altered his respective
position in reliance upon the instrument. In re Trummond's Estate, 290 N. Y. Supp.
40 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
The orthodox view of consideration has been greatly altered by the courts in
cases involving charitable subscriptions. This type of promise is rarely supported by
consideration in the approved sense.' Public policy 2 has dictated that these con-
tracts should be enforced, and the courts, cognizant of this demand, have enlarged
the concept of consideration.3 In view of the confusion of the concept which re-
sults, it is questionable whether the end has justified the means.4 To validate the
subscription the courts must find some consideration5 or have recourse to the
doctrine of "promissory estoppel."' Generally consideration has been found in one
1. Billig, The Problem of Consideration in Charitable Subscriptions (1927) 12 Con,.
L. Q. 467; Carver, Consideration in Clzaritable Subscriptions (1928) 13 Cora. L. Q. 270;
1 Wnlxroy, CoxRA.crs (rev. ed. 1936) §§ 116, 139.
2. The defense of want of consideration in charitable subscription cases has been
characterized as "breaches of faith towards the public," by judge Allen in Barnes v. Perine,
12 N. Y. 18, 24 (1854); see Eastern States Agricultural and Industrial League v. Vail's
Estate, 97 Vt. 495, 500, 124 AUt. 56S, 571 (1924); Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua
County Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 375, 159 N. E. 173, 175 (1927).
3. Early American cases held the subscriptions to be mere gratuities without con-
sideration and unenforceable. Boutell v. Cowdin, 9 Alass. 253 (1812); Trustees of Bridge-
water Academy v. Gilbert, 19 lass. 578 (1824); Trustees of Hamilton College v. Stevart,
1 N. Y. 581 (184S); Wilson v. Baptist Education Society, 10 Barb. 303 (N. Y. 1851).
4. In charitable subscriptions consideration is found where the general law of contract
would have ruled that it was absent. See Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua
County Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 372, 159 N. E. 173, 174 (1927) and cases cited there. See
BlGzow, EsroPPEL (6th ed.) 636, the true doctrine of estoppel is applied only when there
has been a misrepresentation of fact. Finding of any such misrepresentation in charitable
subscriptions seems unwarrantable.
5. Pass v. First National Bank, 25 Ala. App. 519, 149 So. 718 (1933) (consideration
need not be present at time of subscribing but may be supplied by the subsequent conduct
of the beneficiary); Young Mlen's Christian Ass'n v. Estill, 140 Ga. 291, 78 S. E. 1075
(1913); New Jersey Orthopedic Hospital & Dispensary v. Wright, 95 N. J. L. 462, 113
At. 144 (1921); Trustees of Hamilton College v. Stewart, 1 N. Y. 581 (1848); Presby-
terian Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517, 20 N. E. 352 (1889) ; cf. Caul v. Gibson, 3 Pa. 416
(1S46) (moral consideration held to be sufficient); but see, Garrigus v. Mi sionary Society,
3 Ind. App. 91, 28 N. E. 1009, 1010 (1891).
6. ?M1iller v. Western College of Toledo, 177 Ill. 280, 52 N. E. 432 (1898); see Simpson
Centenary College v. Tuttle, 71 Iowa 596, 599, 33 N. W. 74, 76 (1857); Allegheny College
v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 374, 159 N. E. 173, 175 (1927);
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of three forms, 7 to wit; that the mutual promises of the subscribers are consideration
one for the other; 8 that by accepting the subscription the beneficiary makes an
implied promise to apply the funds to the purpose designated by the promisor, thus
making a bilateral contract;0 that the promise to subscribe is an offer, which, when
acted upon in furtherance thereof and in reliance thereon, creates a binding con-
tract.10 In order to employ "promissory estoppel"" as an alternative 12 for con-
sideration, the court must find that the promisee has incurred a substantial detriment,
which the promisor should reasonably have anticipated as a consequence of the
promise. The New York courts have eliminated the first type of consideration'8
and have never actually 14 substituted "promissory estoppel" for consideration.
First Methodist Episcopal Church of Mt. Vernon v. Howard's Estate, 133 Misc. 723, 233
N. Y. Supp. 451 (Surr. Ct. 1929). But cf. Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N. W. 365
(1898) where it was admitted that estoppel is applied ordinarily only in charitable subscrip-
tion cases; nevertheless the court resorted to it in enforcing a gift between individuals. See
Ashley, The Doctrine of Consideration (1913) 26 HARV. L. Rav. 429 (where abolition of
consideration is advocated as preferable to attempt to reach same result by use of such
subterfuges as estoppel); Wright, Ought the Doctrine of Consideration to be Abolished?
(1936) 49 HARv. L. REV. 1225.
7. WIrLSrTO'r, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 116.
8. University of Southern California v. Bryson, 103 Cal. App. 39, 283 Pac. 949 (1929);
Watkins v. Eames, 63 Mass. 537 (1852); Stewart v. Trustees of Hamilton College, 2 Denio
403 N. Y. (1843), overruled, Trustees of Hamilton College, 1 N. Y. 581 (1848); Edinboro
Academy v. Robinson, 37 Pa. 210 (1860).
9. Central Maine Gen. Hospital v. Carter, 125 Me. 191, 132 AtI. 417 (1926); Ladies
Collegiate Institute v. French, 82 Mass. 196 (1860); Allegheny College v. National Chau-
tauqua County Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927); Ohio Wesleyan Female College
v. Higgins, 16 Ohio 20 (1864).
10. Keuka College v. Ray, 167 N. Y. 96, 60 N. E. 325 (1877) (time and money in
getting more subscriptions; promiser's request that the promisee perform the services may
be expressed or implied); Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions v. Smith, 207 Pa. 361,
58 AtI. 689 (1904) (sending missionaries to China) id. at 363, 58 Ati. at 690, "A test of
good consideration is whether the promisee, at the instance of the promisor, has done,
forborne, or undertaken to do anything real, or whether he has suffered any detriment,
or whether, in return for the promise, he has done something that he was not bound to do,
or has promised to do some act, or has abstained from doing something."; 38 A. L. R. 868.
11. The doctrine of "promissory estoppel" has been defined in RESTATEmENT, CoNTRACTs
(1932) § 90. In Study Made in Relation to the Seal and Consideration, N. Y. LEois. Doe.
No. 65(D) (1936) 68, it is said that the broad pronouncement of the Restatement of Con-
tracts is hardly justifiable, as the cases applying "promissory estoppel" are rare.
12. In Study Made in Relation to the Sea and Consideration, N. Y. Laois. Doc. No.
65(D) (1936) 67, it is said, "The enforcement of promises on the basis of promissory
estoppel must be regarded as an exception to the doctrine of consideration .... In a clear
case of promissolry estoppel there is a promise and a detriment suffered in reliance upon
the promise, but the detriment is, (a) subsequent to the promise and (b), not bargained
for." Contra: Porter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 60 F. (2d) 673 (1932) wheye
it was held that "promissory estoppel" is a recognized species of consideration.
13. See Presbyterian Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517, 521, 20 N. E. 352, 353 (1889).
14. The doctrine was not applied in the Allegheny College case. The statement that It
had been adopted was mere dictum. The case of First Methodist Episcopal Church v.
Howard's Estate, 133 Misc. 723, 233 N. Y. Supp. 451 (Surr. Ct. 1929), was brought within
the decision of the Allegheny College case. The court also thought that it came within
the view of the law on promissory estoppel.
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In the instant case it is submitted that the claim was properly rejected. The
subscription could not be upheld on either of the two forms of consideration now
acceptable to the New York courts nor upon the doctrine of "promissory estoppel."
The view that a bilateral contract is created by an implied promise of the bene-
ficiary was applied in the Allegheny College Case'1 to sustain the subscription. But
clearly the case at bar cannot be brought within that decision, for in the Allegh ny
College Case'6 the court found the implied promise to use the funds in accordance
with the subscription only because of the important fact that part payment of the
donation had been made. In the instant case no payment had been made. Mere
acceptance of the subscription would not justify the court in finding such an implied
promise when there was no conduct by the promisee which would warrant the im-
plication. To hold that the promise is an offer which when acted upon creates a
binding contract, the court must find that the donee performed some act or incurred
some liability in furtherance' 7 of and in reliance upon the subscription. It appeared
unlikely to the court that the erection of a building by the beneficiary could have
been in furtherance of and in reliance upon the gift for a special scholarship. Nor
could the claim be supported on the ground of "promissory estoppel," for the
promisor would not have anticipated that the promisee would erect a building as a
consequence of the scholarship subscription.
When charitable subscriptions are contested in court it is natural that sympathy
be extended to the charity, but it is regrettable that sound principles of law should
suffer. Many remedies have been proposed to solve the problem. One writer on
the subject has suggested that the phrase "quasi-consideration" be coined as a
companion to "promissory estoppel."' 8 Restoration of the seal or some substitute
for it has been recommended as a method for rendering enforceable a "non-bargain"
promise, or that charitable subscriptions be treated sui gcneris.19 Conceding the
desirability of enforcing charitable subscriptions, it is submitted that they should
not be invalid for want of consideration. Legislative enactments to this effect have
been suggested which would supplant the present judicial legislation which violates
the underlying principles of contracts.2'1 A promise deliberately made and motivated
by generosity or a moral obligation should be enforced.m
15. 246 N. Y. 369, 159 N. E. 173 (1927).
16. While there is opinion to the contrary, it is submitted that the Allegheny College
case did not extend the concept of consideration; possibly the construction of the facts vs
so liberal as to bring the case within the principle of an implied in fact bilateral contract.
17. "If the promisee performs acts, expends money, or incurs enforceable liabilities on
the faith of the subscription, in furtherance of the enterprise intended to be promoted ...
the subscription is thereby rendered valid, binding and enforceable." Easten States Agri-
cultural and Industrial League v. Vail, 97 Vt. 495, 504, 124 Ad. 563, 573 (1924). Cf. In re
Chavey's Estate, 290 Pac. 1020 (N. Ml. 1930) (where the subscription was for a memorial
building but a gymnasium was built).
18. Billig, The Problems of Consideration in Charitable Subscriptions (1927) 12 Con:.
L. Q. 467.
19. (1925) 23 M]cm L. Rnv. 910.
20. (1928) 27 Mrcn. L. REv. 88.
21. (1901) 15 HARv. L. RrLv. 312; (1914) 62 U. PA. L. RLv. 296; see, as an example of
legislative enactments, GA. CODE (1933) c. 103, § 201 (charitable bequest enforceab!e in
equity).
The suggestion is in line with a recent statute whereby consideration has been abolished
in other branches of the law. N. Y. PEPs. PROP. LDm (1936) § 33, subd. 2 provides that
agreements to change, modify or discharge, in whole or in part, existing contracts or
obligations are not invalid because of the absence of consideration.




CONTRACTS-INFANCY-MISREPRSENTATION AS TO AGE CREATING ESTOPPEL.--The
plaintiffs, members of a partnership, sued the defendant, an infant, for the balance
due on the purchase price of a suit of clothes and a pair of shoes. At the time of the
purchase the defendant was eighteen years of age, but had represented, orally and
in writing, that he had reached his majority. In reliance upon the representation and
without making any independent investigation as to its truthfulness, the plaintiffs had
extended credit to the defendant. On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiffs, held,
the defendant was estopped from setting up his infancy as a defense. Judgment af-
firmed. Clemons v. Olshine, 187 S. E. 711 (Ga. 1936).
There is a division of authority as to whether or not an estoppel will be raised
against an infant who has induced a person to contract with him by representing
himself to be of age.' Some jurisdictions have enacted statutes to estop the infant.2
In the absence of such a statute the majority rule seems to be that the infant cannot
be estopped as to his right of disaffirmance.3 The basis for this doctrine is that a
contrary holding would deprive the infant of the protection with which the law
has seen fit to enfold him.4 Although there is authority to the effect that an action
in tort for deceit may be maintained against an infant who has misrepresented his
age,5 it should be noted that frequently jurisdictions denying the estoppel against the
infant refuse to create a tort liability.6 In the cases disallowing the tort liability it
is argued that an infant should not be made liable when the cause of action arises
from a contract, although a tortious element is admittedly present.7 There is, how-
ever, considerable authority which permits the estoppel.8 The contention urged by
1. See Note (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. REv. 731, 734; Note and Comment (1926) 24 Micu.
L. RFv. 391. For a consideration of the law of the contracts of infants, see 1 W=STON,
CoNTaAcrs (rev. ed. 1936) §§ 222-248.
2. IowA CODE (1935) § 10494; UTAH IREv. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 14-1-3; WAsU. Rv.
STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 5830. These statutes are to the effect that no contract
can be disaffirmed where, due to the infant's misrepresentation as to his age, the other
party had good reason to believe him capable of contracting.
3. This seems to be especially so when the action is one at law. Arkansas Reo Motor
Car Co. v. Goodlett, 163 Ark. 35, 258 S. W. 975 (1924); Williams v. Leon T. Shettler Co.,
98 Cal. App. 282, 276 Pac. 1065 (1929); Miller v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 188 Mo. App.
402, 174 S. W. 166 (1915); Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat. Sec. Corp., 263 N. Y. 245, 188 N.
E. 726 (1934); Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N. C. 109, 116 S. E. 261 (1923).
In the case of Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U. S. 18 (1927), the adult was allowed a
set-off for use and depreciation. It is interesting to note that in New York a similar
compensation was permitted the vendor although there had been no misrepresentation as to
age by the infant. Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 578, 55 N. E. 275 (1899).
The following cases have denied the estoppel in equity: Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300
(1880); Lee v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Society, 177 Cal. 656, 171 Pac. 677 (1918);
Carolina Interstate Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Black, 119 N. C. 323, 25 S. E. 975 (1896).
4. See Note and Comment (1926) 24 Micr. L. REv. 391, 392; (1924) 72 U. or PA. L.
REV. 450.
5. Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind. 472, 9 N. E. 420 (1886); Fitts v. Hall, 9 N. H. 441 (1838);
Wisconsin Loan & Finance Corp. v. Goodnough, 201 Wis. 101, 228 N. W. 484 (1930).
6. Greensboro Morris Plan v. Palmer, 185 N. C. 109, 116 S. E. 261 (1923) (denying
both the estoppel and the tort liability); Collins v. Gifford, 203 N. Y. 465, 96 N. E. 721
(1911) (to the effect that the infant may not be sued in tort since the cause of action
arises from a contract).
7. See Slayton v. Barry, 175 Mass. 513, 515, 56 N. E. 574, 575 (1900); Nash v. Jewett,
61 Vt. 501, 503, 18 At]. 47, 48 (1889).
8. Among the cases at law allowing the estoppel are: Hood v. Duren, 33 Ga. App. 203,
[Vol. 6
RECENT DECISIONS
the courts adopting this view is that a denial of the estoppel would enable an infant
to use his "shield" as a "sword" to assail others.0
In the instant case, the court, in an attempt to justify its decision allowing the
estoppel, sought support from statutes dealing with the liability of infants in the
fields of tort and criminal law. The infant here, under an application of those
statutes' O was of sufficient age to be capable of having a fraudulent intent, and the
court contended that he was competent to act in the situation presented by the case
at bar. It is submitted that the court could have found a sounder basis for its
decision by applying the rule governing contracts made with incompetents not ad-
judicated insane. This rule permits cognizance of such contracts where it may be
shown that the sane party was not aware of the disability, could not be placed in
statu quo, and that the contract did not operate to the disadvantage of the in-
competent." It would seem that in the case of infancy the estoppel should be applied
where there is no knowledge by the other party as to the falsity of the representation
as to age, and where, as in the instant case, the contract did not work an injustice
and the plaintiff cannot be completely restored to his original position. The infant
in such a situation does not require the protection of the law.
While it has always been the policy of the law to protect the infant from his folly
and lack of foresight, one should not disregard the fact that the needs of one era
are not always those of another. The advent of youth into business makes necessary
some relaxation of this policy, for how are persons dealing with the infant to be
protected if his word is not given some recognition at law? 12 That the courts have
been far too zealous in their desire to shield the infant seems undeniable.12 Under
the submitted rule it is conceded that the burden of reimbursement will, in most
instances, fall upon the parent or guardian, and where they have already provided
the infant with necessaries, it would appear that the proposed doctrine will work
hardship. Although the concession is a practical one, it does not effectively militate
against adherence to the submitted rule since the protection which the common law
doctrine offers is primarily directed to the child, and not to his parent or guardian.
125 S. E. 787 (1924); Minck v. Reeder, 107 Neb. 342, 185 N. W. I000 (1921); La Rosa
v. Nichols, 92 N. J. L. 375, 105 Atl. 201 (1918). Cases in equity allowing the estoppel
are: Lewis v. Van Cleve, 302 Ill. 413, 134 N. E. 804 (1922); Looney v. Elkhorn Land &
Improvement Co., 195 Ky. 198, 242 S. W. 27 (1922); Pemberton Bldg. & Loan As 'n v.
Adams, 53 N. J. Eq. 258, 31 At. 280 (1895); Stallard v. Sutherland, 131 Va. 316, 103 S.
E. 568 (1921).
9. See La Rosa v. Nichols, 92 N. 3. L. 375, 379, 105 Ad. 201, 203 (1918); Stallard v.
Sutherland, 131 Va. 316, 319, 108 S. E. 568, 569 (1921).
10. The Georgia Code provides that "Infancy is no defense to an action for a tort,
provided the defendant has arrived at those years of discretion and accountability pre-
scribed by this Code for criminal offences." GA. CoD (Harrison, 1935) § 105-106. The
Code further declares that "A person shall be considered of sound mind who is neither an
idiot, a lunatic, nor afflicted with insanity, and who has arrived at the age of 14 years,
or before that age if such person knows the distinction between good and evil." GA.
Cone (Harrison, 1935) § 26-301.
11. Merry v. Bergfeld, 264 Ill. 84, 105 N. E. 758 (1914); Wells v. Wells, 197 Ind. 236,
150 N. E. 361 (1926); Wood v. Newell, 149 Minn. 137, 182 N. W. 965 (1921); McCarthy
v. Bowling Green Storage & Van Co., 182 App. Div. 18, 169 N. Y. Supp. 463 (1st Dap't
191S); Mulholland v. Sterling Motor Truck Co., 309 Pa. 590, 164 Ad. 597 (1933).
12. See Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat. Sec. Corp., 263 N. Y. 245, 250, 18S N. E. 726, 728
(1934).
13. See Obiter Dictum (1936) 5 Foasm. L. REv. 379.
1937]
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CORPORATIONS-ILLEGAL ACTS-WHAT CONSTITUTES THE PRACTICE OF LAw.-The
respondent carried on a business in the collection and adjustment of commercial
accounts for goods sold by wholesale merchants. If the claims could not be col-
lected in the ordinary manner, the respondent had the right, under the agreement
with its subscribers to appoint an attorney to take legal action. It would determine
whether suit should be brought, provide the attorney with the necessary information
and finally fix the attorney's fee giving him part of the amount collected. The
balance was sent to the client whose claim was involved. On appeal from a decree
restraining the continuance of the respondent's acts, pursuant to statute,' held, such
conduct constituted the practice of law and should be restrained. In re Shoe Mfrs.
Protective Ass'n, Inc., 3 N. E. (2d) 746 (Mass. 1936).
The powers of a corporation are limited by its charter, and any act which exceeds
the limitation imposed is ultra vires. The power to practice law has never been
granted to a corporation because of its inability to meet the requirements imposed
on those who seek to follow the profession.2 In each state there is a statute relating
to the restriction of unauthorized practice of law, both by natural and artificial per-
sons. 3 These statutes, to some degree, act as a stop-gap upon the ever-growing
invasion of corporations and laymen into the field of professional activities. Such
an encroachment leads inevitably to the lowering of the zealously guarded standards
of the profession of law. Independence in thought and action, and service above
self, do not go hand in hand with the objectives of a commercial enterprise. 4 The
client is deprived of the confidential relationship which must exist between himself
and his attorney. This is evidenced clearly in the case at bar, where the attorney
was responsible to the agency, which in turn was responsible to the client.
Since a corporation cannot practice law directly, it follows that indirect practice
through the employment of competent lawyers should be prohibited.5  In the
restraint of indirect practice difficulty is encountered, for each court must thresh out
just what constitutes the practice of law since it is defined by no single norm. It is
subject to numerous interpretations and necessarily so, due to varying circumstances
1. MAss. ANN. LAWS (Lawyers Co-op. 1933) c. 221, § 46 amended (1935) c. 346, § 1.
In addition to the prohibition against the practice of law it reads as follows: "No
corporation or association shall practice or appear as an attorney for any other peison other
than itself ...or to hold out to the public, or advertise as being entitled to practice law,
and no corporation or association shall draw agreements or other legal documents not
relating to its lawful business, or draw wills, or give legal advice in matters not relating
to its lawful business."
2. "The practice of law is not a business open to all, but a personal right, limited to a
few persons of good moral character, with special qualifications ascertained and certified
after a long course of study. . . .The right to practice law is in the nature of a franchise
from the state conferred only by merit . . . it is not a lawful business except for members
of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by the statute and rules
of the courts. . . ." Vann, J., In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 483, 92
N. E. 15, 16 (1910). Cf. Wom.sER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED (1931) 161.
3. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1933) § 5345; ILL REv. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c.
32, §§ 411, 412; N. J. CoiMp. STAT. (Supp. 1931) it. 52, § 2141; Onio GEN. CODE (Page,
1926) § 1706; PA. STAT. Am. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 17, § 1608.
4. In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 483, 92 N. E. 15, 16 (1910); Hicks and
Katz, The Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay Agencies (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 72.
5. Matter of Co-operative Law Co., ibid. Cf. Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 167 N. Y.
244, 246, 60 N. E. 597, 597 (1901) (corporations not permitted to practice medicine, or den-
tistry indirectly by hiring doctors or dentists to act for them) ; People v. Woodbury Derma-
tological Institute, 192 N. Y. 454, 85 N. E. 697 (1908).
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in each set of facts. In the instant case, the court found the collection company
exercising full power over the attorneys employed, so that in effect it was selling
legal services for profit. In accord with this case is the recent adjudication in the
same jurisdiction wherein an automobile association was restrained from performing
an agreement with motor car owners who paid a yearly subscription and in effect,
bought in advance, for the period of one year all the legal services which they
might need.6 However, where a company merely furnished a list of lawyers to its
subscribers without directing the course of the attorney or the client, and received
no direct advantage therefrom, it was held not to be practicing law.7 One collection
agency tried to justify its position by alleging that all the work was carried out by
the attorneys, with the exception of collecting the fee, from which the agency re-
ceived one dollar. The court declared the conduct illegal.8  A similar ruling was
applied to a collection agency which advertised free legal advice through staff
attorneys, though it charged one-quarter of the amount collected as its fee.0
Banks and trust companies have been declared to be practicing law upon holding
themselves as qualified to transact legal business for their customers. These corpora-
tions by means of lawyers employed by them, conducted foreclosure proceedings,
appeared in probate courts and collected the fees usually allowed for such legal
services, while the attorneys received a stated salary.10 Not infrequently such
organizations advertise as being competent to draw wills, trusts, deeds, mortgages
and contracts. This all-embracing offer is clearly within the statutory prohibition.1 '
The proper test to be applied when the acts complained of are considered by many
to be a legitimate sphere for laymen, is fraught with greater difficulties. Mere
ministerial work, such as filling out blanks or drawing instruments of a stereotyped
form where legal judgment is not required as to the effect of any condition therein,
is permissible. But if an instrument or deed is to be drawn from a set of facts
necessarily calling for the considered decision of a legally trained mind, then it
becomes unauthorized practice if performed by anyone but a lawyer.'^ Thus it
6. In re Maclub of America, 3 N. E. (2d) 272 (Mass. 1936). Cf. State v. Retail Credit
Men's Ass'n, 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S. W. (2d) 913 (1931) (attorney given pa-t of fee by
defendant for collecting claim by suit).
7. In re Thibodeau, 3 N. E. (2d) 749 (Mass. 1936).
8. Such conduct would be illegal if the bureau wras not actually performing the services
tendered as the fact remained that it was illegally soliciting business for attorneys. State
v. Merchants Protective Ass'n, 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919) ; cf. People v. Merchants
Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922).
9. Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Ass'n, 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N. E. 577 (1931).
In New York collection agencies are prevented from practicing law. "The statement of
purpose or purposes of a corporation... shall not be construed to include the employment
or furnishing of attorneys to prosecute any action or pursue any legal or equitable remedy
in aid of such collections." N. Y. STocn CoRp. Lmw (1923) § 7.
10. People v. Peoples Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901 (1931). Cf.
In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N. W. 318 (1930) ; People v. Peoples Trust Co., 10 App.
Div. 494, 167 N. Y. Supp. 767 (2d Dep't 1917).
11. In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930).
12. In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co, ibid. In New York title companies are not
within the prohibitions of N. Y. P-NAL Lw (1916) § 280. But only those acts neceasarily
incident to the charter powers may be performed. In re Co-operative Law Co, 193 N. Y.
479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910); People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N. Y. 366, 125 N. E.
666 (1919). Where a title company advertised a schedule of rates for drawing papers, and
upon drawing a bill of sale and chattel mortgage for a set fee, it was held that this
was not the practice of law, since it was an isolated instance. But if the defendant company
1937]
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would seem that to attempt to mold one criterion by which acts allegedly un-
authorized might be measured to gauge their illegality, would be a fruitless gesture.
Furthermore there is a conflict of opinion with regard to how the unauthorized
practice of law should be treated. One viewpoint, based upon a frank acceptance
of present day conditions and upon a realization of the influential r6le corporations
play in the commercial world, would be curative in its operation. It would not
attempt by prosecution to restrain corporations from continuing the illegal practice,
but would rather impose on them the "same requirements, standards and obligations
of the moral law and conscience which are imposed on individual lawyers."' 8 The
antithetical viewpoint is found in the current method of treating illegal practice.
It is preventative in its operation as restraining orders are utilized. Adherents of
this view admit it may be ineffectual in part, but believe that certain legislative
changes in present statutes would ameliorate the situation. It has been suggested that
statutes imposing a penalty on any corporation undertaking to practice law should be
enacted in those states where they do not exist. Exceptions, in favor of any type
of business should be shunned, as such exceptions open the way for abuses and im-
pair the effectiveness of the statute. Lastly it is believed that no statute should
take upon itself the task of defining just what does constitute the practice of law.
This phase of the question should be left to sound judicial interpretation 14
EVIDENcE-ADIIssIBILiTY IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION UNDER STATUTES RELAT-
ING TO TRANSACTIONS WITH DECEASED---The deceased, arrested on a criminal charge,
was held in the county jail pending trial. It was alleged in the complaint that while
thus incarcerated, he was severely beaten by the sheriff and his deputies, and as a
result, died. The plaintiff, the widow of the deceased, as his administratrix joined
an action for wrongful death with one for physical injuries and mental pain suf-
fered by the deceased. The defendants, seeking to escape liability, sought to testify
that the injuries which caused decedent's death were self-inflicted, and that they
had used only a reasonable amount of force in attempting to restrain him from
injuring himself in a temporary fit of insanity. This testimony was excluded as to
both causes of action. On appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, hdd,
the evidence was competent in the action for wrongful death, but inadmissable in
the suit which survived for injuries suffered by the decedent, as it constituted a
had made a business of drawing such instruments which were unconnected with Its
authorized work, it would be illegal. Pound J., concurring in People v. Title Guarantee &
Trust Co., supra, at 380, 125 N. E. at 670, found the oral advice test unsatisfactory in
determining whether or not illegal practice was committed further. "If such services as
were rendered in this case are customarily rendered I think they should be characterized
as legal services. This does not imply that a real estate broker may not prepare leases,
mortgages and deeds; or that an installment house may not prepare conditional bills of
sale in connection with the business, and as a part thereof. The preparation of the legal
papers may be ancillary to the daily business of the actor, or it may be the business
itself."
13. Wormser, Corporations and the Practice of Law (1936) 5 FoRauAm L. RaV. 207,
218; Encroachments by Corporations on Private Practice, 1 LFcR,s ON LEoAL TopiCs
547, 561; WoRmsER, FRA KENSTEmn INcORPORATED (1931) pp. 161-180; Note (1931) 44
HARv. L. REv. 1114.
14. Jackson, in foreword to Hiccs AND KATz, UNAUTHOR ZED PRACTiC OF LAW (1934) 3.
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transaction with the deceased within the meaning of a statute' prohibiting such testi-
mony. Judgment reversed. Maciejczak v. Bartell, 60 P. (2d) 31 (Wash. 1936).
In the early development of American jurisprudence no witness, who was interested
in the event was permitted to testify.2 The unfairness of this rule soon became
apparent and statutes were passed in almost every jurisdiction abolishing this dis-
qualification; 3 but a noteworthy exception was retained excluding the testimony of
the survivor of a transaction with a decedent, when offered against the latter's estate.
This fragment of the ancient disqualification, prevails at the present time in all but
a very few jurisdictions of the United States. 4 The statutes are quite varied in
their wording, some making the disqualification absolute;0 others permitting testimony
when the representative of the decedent has introduced evidence relevant to the
transaction.6 The basis for the rule seems to be that when death has closed the
1. WAsH. R.v. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1933) § 1211.
2. This general disqualification was apparently adopted by our common law from the
common law of England, where it originated in the early seventeenth century. For a
history of this rule see 1 WaiGomE, Evm aNc (2d ed. 1923) § 575.
3. The disqualification was abolished in England in 1843 by the statute 6 & 7 Vict. c.
85. In the United States the first statute enacted was MacH. Rr. STAT. (1846) c. 102 § 99.
The New York statute, which drew a great deal of attention, was passed in 1M4, and
the other states soon followed suit. N. Y. Laws (1848) c. 379, §§ 351, 352.
4. Some of the more important statutes establishing the disqualification are: AXm CooE
AN. (Mlichie, 1928) § 7721; FLA. Comusp. Grn¢. LAws AxNi. (1927) § 4372; L'o. SLAT. Am-.
(Burns, 1933) § 2-1715; I.E. Rav. STAT. (1930) c. 96, § 119; N. J. ComP. SrAT. (1911) tit.
Evid., § 4; N. Y. Cnv. PRAc. AcT § 347; Tr.Nu. CoDE (Will. Shan. & Harlow, 1932) § 97S0;
Wis. STAT. (1935) § 325.16. Contra: Aiz. REv. STAT. (1928) § 4414; Co:=;. GN. STAT.
(1930) §§ 55S2, 5608; M oNT. Rv. ConE AvN. (Choate, 1921) § 10535; N. H. Pun. LAws
(1926) c. 336, §§ 27, 28; N. M. STAT. AzN. (Courtright, 1929) § 45-601; O=a. CoDE A;.
(1930) § 9-403.
5. Parties or persons in whose behalf an action is brought against a representative of
the decedent estate are absolutely disqualified from testifying in the following jurisdictions:
CAL. CoDE Civ. Paoc. (Deering, 1935) § 1880; ID.%o CODE Aan. (1932) § 16-202; IMIss.
CODE Amr. (1930) § 1529. The State of Washington imposes absolute disqualification on
any party interested or of the record, whether suing or being sued. W, As. R,. STAT. Am..
(Remington, 1932) § 1211.
6. Some statutes provide an exception when the testimony of the deceased is placed
in evidence. K-Ax Rxv. STAT. Aurar. (1923) § 60-2804; fn. STAT. (Neason, 1927) § 9817;
N. D. Coinp. LAws Aim. (1913) § 7871; S. D. Comp. LAws (1929) § 2717 (2); or when
called as witness by the other side: DEL. Rv. STAT. (1915) § 4212; TemP;. CooE (Will.
Shan. & Harlow 1932) § 9780; TEx. A N.N. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) § 3716; UTA H. REV.
STAT. Ai-x. (1933) § 104-49-2. Some provide for exceptions in both instances: Ars. CooE
Au r. (Michie, 1928) § 7721; MD. ANNr. Coon (Bagby, 1924) art. 35, § 3. Others provide
for an exception when the representative of the deceased or a pron interested in the
event takes the stand in his own behalf and testifies to the transaction: GA. Coon (1933)
§ 38-1603; IowA CODE (1935) §§ 11257, 11258; N. J. Colo. STAT. (1911) tit. Evid, § 4.
Others provide for an exception when the representative of the deceased, or a lapron in-
terested in the event, testifies to the transaction, or where testimony of the deceased is
introduced in evidence: FL". Comm. GEN. LAws AN-,. (1927) § 4372; L.D. STAT. Azmz.
(Burns, 1933) §§ 2-1715, 2-1717; MEa. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 96, § 119; NED. Coin.. STAT.
(1929) § 20-1202; N. Y. Civ. Pr,,. AcT § 347; N. C. Coon A.mz;. (1935) § 1795. Two
jurisdictions do not apply the statutes in actions for wrongful death: Omo Coon Azzm.
(Page, 1926) § 11495; Wyo. REv. STAT. A.m'. (Courtright, 1931) § 89-1704.
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mouth of one party to the transaction, the courts will close the mouth of the other.7
Praiseworthy as it is, aiming to protect decedents' estates from false claims by the
introduction of testimony which cannot be controverted, it would seem that the rule
may at times work an injustice to the survivor whose testimony is excluded. The
rule is founded upon a false premise: "Every man, interested in the event, will
falsify when his words are incapable of contradiction." The opposite tenet is, of course,
equally false.8 It would seem that some mean should be reached whereby neither
the living nor the dead will be granted an advantage. Some legislatures have at-
tempted to achieve this result by allowing the admission of the survivors' testimony,
if corroborated,9 or by making the rule discretionary rather than absolute, so that
the trial court may admit the evidence or bar it in the interest of justice.' 0
A majority of jurisdictions apply the disqualification not only to personal com-
munications in the field of contracts, but also to actions ex delicto.11 Under this
view, in actions by an administrator for injuries suffered by the decedent, it is clear
that the tort which caused the injuries is a personal transaction and so within the
prohibiting statute. But a different situation arises in actions for the wrongful death
of a decedent. In jurisdictions where the statute grants the right of action directly
to the widow or next of kin, it is held that the tort is not such a transaction for the
purposes of the action since suit is not brought by a representative of the decedent,
but rather by a third party in his individual capacity.' 2 In other jurisdictions where
the right of action is placed in the administrator, with the damages inuring to the
benefit of the widow and children, or next of kin, there is a conflict upon the point.
Some hold, as in the instant case, that the testimony is admissible on the ground
that the administrator is a nominal party only;' 3 others bar the testimony, holding
that the statute should apply to every action brought by an administrator, without
reference to the disposition to be made of the recovery.14 It would seem that the
former view is sound, for the estate of the decedent is not interested in the result
and moreover the right of action never existed in the deceased but arose only upon
his death. It is true that at first glance practical difficulties may seem to beset this
7. "This right and privilege [of testifying] must be mutual. It cannot exist in one
party and not in the other. If death has closed the lips of one party, the policy of the
law is to close the lips of the other." Louis v. Easton, 50 Ala. 470, 471 (1873).
8. For an excellent general criticism of the interest disqualification see 7 BENTIIAM,
RATiONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827) (Bowring's ed.) 393, quoted in 1 WomonE,
EVIDENCE (2d.ed. 1923) 997.
9. ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 9-403; N. M. STAT. ANN?. (Courtright, 1929) § 45-601.
10. ARIz. REV. STAT. (1928) § 4414 (as construed in Goldman v. Sotelo, 7 Ariz. 23, 60
Pac. 696 [1900] and in Costello v. Gleeson, 15 Ariz. 280, 138 Pac. 544 (1914]) ; N. H. Pun.
LAws (1926) c. 336, §§ 27, 28; MONT. REV. CoDn ANN. (Choate, 1921) § 10535.
11. Napier v. Elliott, 152 Ala. 248, 44 So. 552 (1907); Di Nardi v. Standard Lime &
Stone Co., 3 Boyce 369, 84 Atl. 124 (Del. 1912); Sherlock v. Alling, 44 Ind. 184 (1873);
Kentucky Utilities Co. v. McCarthy, 169 Ky. 38, 183 S. W. 237 (1916); Abelein v. Porter,
45 App. Div. 307, 61 N. Y. Supp. 144 (4th Dep't 1899)
12. McEwan v. Springfield, 64 Ga. 159 (1879); Entwhistle v. Feigner, 60 Mo. 214
(1875); Mann v. Weiland, 81 Pa. 243 (1876).
13. Central Iron and Coal Co. v. Hamacher, 248 Fed. 50 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918); Kuyken-
dall v. Edmonson, 205 Ala. 265, 87 So. 882 (1921); Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Charman,
161 Ind. 95, 67 N. E. 923 (1903); Hale v. Kearly, 8 Baxt. 49 (Tenn. 1874).
14. Di Nardi v. Standard Lime & Stone Co., 3 Boyce 369, 84 Aft. 124 (Del. 1912);
Forbes v. Snyder, 94 I"1. 374 (1880); Kentucky Utilities Co. v. McCarthy, 169 Ky. 38, 183
S. W. 237 (1916); Abelein v. Porter, 45 App. Div. 307, 61 N. Y. Supp. 144 (4th Dep't
1899); Minns v. Crossman, 118 Misc. 70, 193 N. Y. Supp. 714 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
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view making it unwise to join a cause of action for wrongful death with one for
injuries suffered by the decedent. Since the defendant is a competent witness in the
action for wrongful death, and incompetent in the one for injuries suffered by the
decedent, the jury might unwittingly consider the evidence admitted in the one in
its decision of the other. However this difficulty is of little consequence as most
jurisdictions provide for a severance of causes of action when a joinder at one trial
would work injustice or unfairness.
It would seem that the rule adopted by a few jurisdictions, replacing the absolutism
of generalization by the discretionary judgment of the court,' 5 is the most equitable
and practical rule of all. Justice is far better served by deciding each question on its
own merits, than by striving to promulgate a single standard to embrace all
potentialities.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-WHAT CONSTITUTES CONTROL OF PRnzs -- Lrzn-t- or
LESSEE OF ENTIRE PREMISES FOR INJURIES To T HmI PARTi.-The plaintiff was
struck by the body of a painter falling from an insecurely fastened scaffold which
had given way while the painter was working on a sign. Gotham & Co., lessees of the
entire building, had subleased the sign in question to Strauss & Co., who in turn em-
ployed one Well as an independent contractor to paint the sign. The plaintiff sued
all three for injuries. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint as to Gothiu &
Co. and Strauss & Co. On appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division re-
versing the dismissal of the complaint and granting a new trial, held, two judges
dissenting, Gotham & Co. was liable as lessee of the entire building, being in the
position of an owner in possession who had retained control over certain parts thereof
and was thus answerable for the safe maintenance of those parts. Judgment affirmed.
Rohlls v. Weil, 271 N. Y. 444, 3 N. E. (2d) 588 (1936).
There can be no quarrel with the statement of the law in this case, inasmuch as
it holds in accord with the weight of authority' that where the landlord retains
control of part of the premises and the injury is caused by a defect in such part,
the landlord is liable to third parties injured thereby. But the test of what
actually constitutes control is at best a nebulous affair and subject to varying inter-
pretations.2 It seems to be a universal rule that where the landlord, under his
contract with the tenant, reserves the right to enter to make repairs, he has re-
tained sufficient control to subject him to liability to third parties for the defective
condition of the premises. 3 Whether the reverse of this principle is equally true is
extremely doubtful, although there are cases holding that the landlord is not liable
for injuries to third parties where he has not covenanted to repair.4 Generally,
15. See note 7, supra.
1. Davis v. Pacific Power Co., 107 Cal. 563, 40 Pac. 950 (1895); Shipley v. Fifty As-
sociates, 101 Mlass. 251 (1869); Poor v. Sears, 154 Mlass. 539, 28 N. E. 1046 (1891);
Jennings v. Van Schaik, 108 N. Y. 530, 15 N. E. 424 (1888); O'Connot v. Andrews, 81
Tex. 28, 16 S. W. 628 (1891).
2. Note (1914) 50 L. R. A. (n,. s.) 312.
3. Smith v. Preston, 104 Me. 156, 71 Atl. 653 (1903); Appel v. Muller, 262 N. Y.
278, 186 N. E. 785 (1933); see Heaven v. Pender, 9 Q. B. D. 302 (1882). The landlord
is not responsible, however, unless he has received notice of need for repairs.
4. Frischberg v. Hurter, 173 Mlass. 22, 52 N. E. 1086 (1899) (injury by falling into
a coal hole); Curran v. Flammer, 49 App. Div. 293, 62 N. Y. Supp. 1061 (1st Dep't
1900) (injury caused by defective grating); Hirschfield v. Alsberg, 47 Misc. 141, 93
N. Y. Supp. 617 (Sup. Ct. 1905) (injury from breaking of window and falling of
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however, in the absence of a covenant to repair, the courts are necessarily guided by
the facts peculiar to the case before them.5
An analogous situation is presented where a third party receives injuries from
the fall of a sign attached by the tenant to the wall outside the leased premises.
New York has denied the landlord's liability for such injuries because of the want of
control over the premises by him.6 Massachusetts, on the other hand, has held
the landlord liable for the defective condition of the sign, charging him with the
necessity of making sure that the sign was maintained in a safe condition.7 New
York was faced with the necessity of construing a building ordinance which states:
C ...signs ...may be placed on the front of buildings with the consent of the
owner thereof. They shall be securely fastened. .... ,,8 It was forced to be more
specific in treating the subject of control than was the other jurisdiction. It decided
that the consent of the owner did not thereby give him control over the erection
and maintenance of the sign, since consent to its erection was not an authorization
to set it up negligently.9 This holding is in accord with the general rule that the
tenant is entitled to exclusive possession as against the landlord' o and that certain
parts of the premises, although not specifically mentioned in the lease, go to the
tenant by implication because of their value to the part leased.11 Had the accident,
in the case at bar, resulted from a condition of the wall itself, defective at the time
it was leased to the tenant, then the landlord would unquestionably have been
liable. 12
It is difficult to reconcile the instant case with these general principles. The court
herein has based its conclusion that the landlord was in control of the scaffold upon
the fact that the ropes could scarcely have been fastened without the landlord's
permission to enter the building,' 3 and that the landlord did not alienate the entire
glass); Harte v. Jones, 287 Pa. 37, 134 Atl. 467 (1926), 47 A. L. R. 846 (1927) (injury
by falling through door guarding excavation between buildings).
5. The basic theory of liability is as expressed in Smith v. Preston, 104 Me. 156, 160,
71 Atl. 653, 656 (1908): "Such liability rests upon the elementary principle that the
party whose neglect of duty causes the damages is responsible therefor."
6. Zolezzi v. Bruce-Brown, 243 N. Y. 490, 154 N. E. 535 (1926).
7. Woodman v. Shepard, 238 Mass. 196, 130 N. E. 194, 13 A. L. R. 985 (1921).
8. N. Y. C. Code of Ordinances (1934) c. 23, art. 16, § 210.
9. Zolezzi v. Bruce-Brown, 243 N. Y. 490, 154 N. E. 535 (1926).
10. Brock v. Desmond, 154 Ala. 634, 45 So. 665 (1908); Genardini v. Kline, 19 Ariz.
558, 173 Pac. 882 (1918) ; Kellogg v. King, 114 Cal. 378, 46 Pac. 166 (1896); St. Vincent's
Roman Catholic Congregation v. Kingston Coal Co., 221 Pa. 349, 70 Atl. 838 (1908);
Huffman v. Cooley, 283 S. D. 475, 134 N. W. 49 (1912).
11. Clark v. Koesheyan, 26 Cal. App. 305, 146 Pac. 904 (1915); Bee Building Co. v.
Peters Trust Co., 106 Neb. 294, 183 N. W. 302 (1921); Voorhees v. Burchard, 55 N. Y.
98 (1873); Edmisson v. Lowry, 3 S. D. 77, 42 N. W. 583, 17 L. R. A. 275 (1892);
Stonegap Colliery Co. v. Kelly, 115 Va. 390, 79 S. E. 341 (1913).
12. "But when injuries result to a third person from the faulty or defective construction
of the premises, or from their ruinous condition at the time of the demise, or because
they then constitute a nuisance, even if this only becomes active by the tenant's ordinary
use of the premises, the landlord is still liable, notwithstanding the lease." TAYLOR,
LANDLORD AND TENANT (8th ed.) § 174.
13. The landlord's permission to enter upon the premises to do anything in connection
with the carrying out of the lease would seem to be implied from the lease Itself.
Trustees of Canandaigua v. Foster, 156 N. Y. 354, 50 N. E. 971, 41 L. R. A. 554 (1898).
It certainly must have been within the contemplation of the parties here that the tenant
would have to suspend a scaffold occasionally to keep the sign painted. Such use would
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property. In effect the Court of Appeals reverses the test of control that it applied
in Zolezzi v. Bruce-Brown,14 decided only a decade earlier, where the court specifically
stated that the consent of the owner to the erection of the sign did not constitute
control over the sign by the owner.15 Nor does the fact that the owner did not
alienate the entire property have any significance so long as he withdrew control over
the leased premises.16 The court is not so sanguine as to suggest that the landlord
would have had the right to enter upon the scaffold to see that it was being carefully
fastened even had he a premonition that all was not well. The negligence causing
the injury was occasioned by the careless fastening of the ropes by the painters; it
was therefore confined to the scaffold. As in the Zolezzi Case, the tenant here under
the rights of his lease, erected the object which caused the injury and maintained
it himself.17 His subsequent wrongful acts, after he had received the owner's
consent, should not make the owner a party to the wrong.' 8
carry with it the implied right to use whatever other parts of the premises might be
necessary to the enjoyment of the tenant's rights.
14. " ... it does not expressly or by fair implication impose upon the owner the duty
to see that the sign is securely erected or carefully maintained after the consent is given.
An owner may lawfully part with control of his property which at that time constitutes
no danger to others. The ordinance does not compel him to maintain limited control
for the purpose of seeing that no nuisance is thereafter placed upon it. The erection
of a sign constitutes no nuisance in itself, and consent to its erection is no authorization
to do such act in unlawful manner. . . .There can be no presumption that, under a con-
sent to do an act which is lawful in itself, a tenant will act unlawfully, and the ordinance
does not require a consenting owner, who has leased an or part of a buildling, to
guard against abuse of his consent by a tenant who attaches a sign to the front wall
of a loft leased to him." Lehman, J., in Zolezzi v. Bruce-Brown, 243 N. Y. 490, 495, 154
N. E. 535, 537 (1926).
It is interesting to note that Lehman, J., wrote the dissenting opinion in the case at bar.
15. In the instant case, the court said: "The ropes by which the scaffold was
suspended were secured to the roof of the building. The photographs in evidence show
that it is scarcely possible that they could have been so fastened except by this appellant's
permission to enter into the building by the men who attached the hooks to the cornice
or parapet. A jury could reasonably infer that this dangerous obstruction to street
travel was erected with the consent of this appellant." Rohlfs v. Well, 271 N. Y. 444, 449,
3 N. E. (2d) 588, 589 (1936).
16. The court seems to imply a distinction between alienation of the entire property
and the surrender of control over the leased premises. As a practical matter it would
seem that there is no such distinction.
17. It might be argued that there is a ground of distinction between the Zolezzi
case and the present case, since in the former the owner had leased the entire prop2rty
to another and was out of possession, while in the latter the lessee of the entire building
occupied the position of owner in 'possession. Yet the came court has held, in Kirby v.
Newman, 239 N. Y. 470, 147 N. E. 69 (1925), that an owner in pozez on was not
liable for the negligent opening of the cellar doors of his building by the tenant's
servants, although the owner had not leased the cellar to the tenant but merely allowed
him the use of it for storage, on the ground that the owner wag not liable for the
carelessness of third parties in using doors which the owner had properly constructed.
The court said: "The burden, however, is not one of insurance of the safety of the
opening,.. ." Id. at 474, 147 N. E. at 70. And in the opinion in the Zolezzi case, Lehman,
J. says: " ... the ordinance does not require a consenting owner who has leased all or part
of a building to guard against abuse of his consent .... " Zolezzi v. Bruce-Brown, 243 N. Y.
490, 496, 154 N. E. 535, 537 (1926). The theoretical distinction does not seem to have
been stressed by the court.
18. Where the premises or the part thereof causing the injury are properly con-
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LiPE INSURANCE-PUBLIC POLICY-RECOVERY ALLOWED WHERE INSURED WAS
EXECUTED.-The deceased had taken out a life insurance policy from the defendant
company. No express stipulation therein gave the insurer a defense in the event
of the insured's death at the hands of justice. Found guilty of a capital crime,
the insured was executed. On appeal from a judgment in favor of the beneficiary
in an action to recover the amount due, held, public policy does not prevent
recovery on a life insurance policy where the insured has been executed by the
state. Judgment affirmed. Progressive Life Ins. Co. v. Dean, 97 S. W. (2d) 62 (Ark.
1936).
The problem presented to the court in the instant case has been the source
of great judicial conflict. The view of the court coincides with the modern trend
of authority in allowing recovery in such cases.' The question first arose in
Fauntleroy's Case,2 decided in England, which held that public policy forbade re-
covery on the life insurance of one executed for a capital crime. This ruling
has been explained 3 ' on the ground that the court gave judicial expression to the
public policy declared in the law of forfeitures 4 which was in force at that time.
The reasoning of the English Court was adopted by the United States Supreme
Court, first denying recovery in an analogous situation where the deceased was a
suicide5 and, secondly, in a case where the deceased was executed.0 It is to be
structed and not out of repair, the injury being caused solely by the tenant's negligence,
there is respectable authority for the holding that the landlord should not be liablo.
Kalis v. Shattuck, 69 Cal. 593, 11 Pac. 346 (1886); Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Shiel, 45 Ind.
App. 623, 88 N. E. 957 (1909); Lufkin v. Zane, 157 Mass. 117, 31 N. E. 757, 17
L. R. A. 251 (1892); Fehlhauer v. St. Louis, 178 Mo. 635, 77 S. W. 843 (1903);
Shroeck v. Reiss, 46 App. Div. 502, 61 N. Y. Supp. 1054 (1st Dep't 1900); Opper v.
Hellinger, 116 App. Div. 261, 101 N. Y. Supp. 616 (1st Dep't 1906); Gensler v.
Kemble, 227 Pa. 508, 76 AtI. 223 (1910).
1. Allen v. Diamond, 13 F. (2d) 579 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926); Collins v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 232 I1. 37, 83 N. E. 542 (1907); Weeks v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
128 S. C. 223, 122 S. E. 586 (1924); Fields v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 Tenn.
464, 249 S. W. 798 (1923); Corey v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 178 S. E.
525 (W. Va. 1935). Several decisions have allowed recovery on these facts but have
based their finding on the presence of an incontestability clause in the policy. Supreme
Lodge v. Overton, 203 Ala. 193, 82 So. 443 (1919); Afro-American Life Ins. Co. v. Jones,
113 Fla. 158, 151 So. 405 (1933); Murphy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 152 Ga. 393,
110 S. E. 178 (1921). It would seem that the presence of this clause should not be a
factor, but public policy should be the primary consideration in arriving at the decision.
See Corey v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, at 526 where Kenna, J., said
"... why not permit the company simply to stipulate that it will not contest liability
under the policy on the ground of public policy at any time or in any event, and thus
render the courts powerless to enforce the public policy of the state in so far as life
insurance contracts are concerned?"
2. Amicable Society v. Bolland, 4 Bligh (n. s.) 194, 5 Eng. Reprints 70 (Ch. 1830).
3. See Collins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 Ill. 37, 83 N. E. 542 (1907).
4. Forfeitures for, crime were abolished in England by 33 and 34 Vicr., c. 23 (1870).
5. Ritter v. Mutual Ins. Co., 169 U. S. 139 (1898). It is to be noted that there
was a strong element of fraud in this case, the deceased being heavily in debt by reason
of the improper use of moneys entrusted to him in a fiduciary capacity. Just before
his death he wrote to his partner, ". . . but I deserve all the punishment I may get, only
I feel my debts must be paid. This sacrifice will do it and only this."
6. Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362 (1902). The court in this
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noted that in cases where a beneficiary of a suicide seeks recovery, the states have
almost universally rejected the decision of the Supreme Court.7 And it has been
discredited by later decisions of the same court s even though it appears that in
such a situation there would be likelihood of the insurer being defrauded.
The cases that deny recovery when the deceased has been executed find justifica-
tion for their decision on the ground that public policy would forbid payment, in
that payment would serve to induce crime.0 This ruling has been criticized as being
"fanciful' 0 and "bordering on the absurd""1 by courts holding the opposite view
and it would seem that they are justified. The possibility of the insured being
superinduced to turn criminal by the prospect of his beneficiaries collecting on his
life policy is so remote as to be negligible. Another weakness of the inducement
theory is the fact that it is not the crime itself which causes the forfeiture of
the policy but the punishment which follows its commission. For example, a
man could be convicted of a capital crime and escape execution by the intervention
of a pardon, natural death, or other cause and in such a case his life policy would
remain enforceable. It would seem that public policy would be best served by
requiring payment of the amount of the policy, for then creditors would be pro-
tected,' 2 and dependent families would be provided with some means of securing
case and in Ritter v. Mutual Ins. Co., 169 U. S. 139 (1898) note 5, supra, adopted in
its opinion the argument of the English court in Amicable Society v. Bolland, 4 Bligh
(n. s.) 194, 5 Eng. Reprints 70 (Ch. 1830) in which the Lord Chancellor decided that
since an express stipulation to insure against death by legal execution is against public
policy as tending to encourage 'crime, the court could not allow recovery in the case
of an ordinary life policy. This argument which was said to be unanswerable in (1903)
21 HARv. L. R.v. 530, 531, appears to be refuted in Weeks v. New York Life Ins. Co,
128 S. C. 223, 229, 122 S. E. 586, 58S (1924) where it was said: ". . . where one takes
out an ordinary life policy, to be matured by death by any cause, no basis in reason
or experience exists for assuming that the insured had any intent at the time of making
the contract to accelerate the maturity of the policy by committing a capital crime and
suffering the death penalty."
7. Supreme Conclave v. Miles, 92 Md. 613, 48 AU. 845 (1901); Kerr v. Minnmsota
Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 39 Minn. 174, 39 N. W. 312 (188S); Lange v. Royal Highlanders, 75
Neb. 18S, 110 N. W. 1110 (1907); Campbell v. Supreme Conclave, 66 N. J. L. 274, 49
Aft. 550 (1901); Marcus v. Heralds of Liberty, 241 Pa. 429, 88 Ad. 678 (1913);
Jackson v. Loyal Additional Ben. Ass'n, 140 Tenn. 495, 205 S. W. 318 (1918); Pat-
terson v. Insurance Co., 100 Wis. 118, 75 N. W. 980 (1898).
8. Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 U. S. 489 (1907); Northwestern Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 254 U. S. 96 (1920).
9. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 234 (1912); Collins v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Pa. Sup. Ct. 353 (1905); ScaTborough v. American Nat.
Ins. Co., 171 N. C. 353, 88 S. E. 4S2 (1916); Smith v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 125
Misc. 670, 211 N. Y. Supp. 755 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1925); Burt v. Union Central
Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362 (1902) is the leading case on this point in the United States.
It would seem that the decision would have been different had the court taken cognizance
of a statute enacted by Congress which said: "No conviction or judgment shall work
corruption of blood or any forfeiture of estate." 1 STAT. 117 (1790), 18 U. S. C. A.
§ 544 (1909).
10. Fields v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 Tenn. 464, 476, 249 S. W. 798, 801 (1923).
11. Collins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 Ill. 37, 45, 83 N. E. 542, S44 (1907).
12. It is a common practice for people to use their life insurance policies as sEcurity for
loans.
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the necessities of life. Another basis advanced for the denial of recovery is that
there is a condition implied in fact in the contract of insurance to do nothing
which wrongfully accelerates the maturity of the policy. This is founded on the
supposed similarity between cases of the type of the instant case and a situation in
which arson is committed. It appears that the criticism, which labels such reasoning
specious and condemns the analogy as false, is justified for fire and life insurance
are radically different.1 3
It would seem that since the consideration to be paid for life insurance is com-
puted from the experience tables of mortality which embrace death by legal execu-
tion as well as from other causes, recovery should be allowed where the insured
has been executed.' 4 This possibility might be considered a circumstance within
the contemplation of the parties. If the insurer desires to avoid payment under
such circumstances, it would be a simple solution to insert a clause to that
effect in the policy. Caution should be exercised before introducing by construction
or implication exceptions into such contracts which usually contain special exceptions.
MoRTGAGES-NEGLIGENCE--EFFECT OF FAILURE TO SEARCH RECoRD ON RIGHT OF
SUBROGATION AS AGAINST SECOND MORTGAGEE.-The defendant, on the assurances of
X that she was to receive a first mortgage, advanced money to X for the purpose
of releasing a first mortgage on X's property. The senior mortgage was canceled
of record and a new mortgage executed to the defendant. The defendant, relying
on the false representations of X that no other incumbrance existed on the property,
neglected to examine the record which would have disclosed that the property was
subject to a second mortgage in favor of the plaintiff. On the plaintiff's suit to
foreclose his lien the defendant cross-complained and prayed that her mortgage be
declared a first mortgage on the property. On appeal from a judgment for the de-
fendant, held, two justices dissenting, that the negligence of the defendant in not
searching the record did not preclude her subrogation to the rights of the original
first mortgagee. Judgment affirmed. Martin v. Hickenlooper, 59 P. (2d) 1139
(Utah 1936).
The instant case represents a modem development of the doctrine of subrogation
prevalent in numerous jurisdictions, sometimes titled "conventional subrogation."l
This extension of the right of subrogation is invoked only in cases where a lender,
under an express or implied agreement with the borrower to be placed in the posi-
tion of the creditor whose debt will be canceled by his loan, fails to take an assign-
ment of the security released. 2 Equity, upon such facts where no innocent parties
13. Campbell v. Supreme Conclave, 66 N. J. L. 274, 279, 49 AtI. 550, 552, where
Collins, J., said, "But the case of life insurance is not parallel. Strict insurance is
indemnity. Voluntary and unnecessary destruction of the property insured is inconsistent
with the basis of the contract, but the basis of that which by a misnomer is called
'insurance upon life' is altogether different. That is an arbitrary agreement to pay a
fixed sum upon the happening of an inevitable event, to wit, the death of the insured,
without regard to the value of his life or the loss sustained by the assured." See also
VANCE, INsURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 81.'
14. VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 813; see Weeks v. New York Life Ins. Co., 128
S. C. 223, 237, 122 S. E. 586, 590 (1924); Note (1925) 36 A. L. R. 1255.
1. 2 JONs, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 1114.
2. Simon Newman Co. v. Fink, 206 Cal. 143, 273 Pac. 565 (1928); Home Say. Bank
v. Bierstadt, 168 Ill. 618, 48 N. E. 161 (1897); First Nat. Bank v. Moore, 88 Ind. App.
580, 163 N. E. 602 (1928); Jackson Trust Co. v. Gilkinson, 105 N. J. Eq. 116, 147 AtI.
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will suffer, or no superior equities have intervened, will treat the matter as if an
assignment had been executed.3 But in addition to cases where the intervening
equities of third parties preclude subrogation, the conduct of a lender himself has
at times constrained equity from extending assistance. Thus waiver4 and lachesO
are elements which preclude the courts from granting relief.0
There is a definite division of authority as to the weight to be given to the ele-
ment of negligence in failing to examine the record as a basis for the denial of
relief. The minority rule has opposed the subrogation of negligent lenders where
the record gives constructive notice of an intervening interest on the ground that
the affirmative aid would be a reward for negligent conduct.7 On the other hand,
those courts which permit subrogation on these facts have argued that the recording
statutes raise no barrier to subrogation. Such statutes, they contend, were enacted
for the purpose of protecting subsequent purchasers or lenders from changing their
position without knowledge of prior liens; they were not intended to permit an
113 (1929); Gans v. Thieme, 93 N. Y. 225 (1883); Miller v. Scott, 23 Ohio App. 50, 154
N. E. 3538 (1924); Bankers' Loan & Invest. Co. v. Hornish, 94 Va. 603, 27 S. E. 459 (1897).
In Gans v. Thieme, supra, at 231, the court said, "It is no doubt true, however, ... that
a volunteer cannot acquire either an equitable lien or the right to subrogation, but one
who, at the request of another, advances his money to redeem or even to pay off a
security in which that other has an interest, or to the discharge of which he is hound,
is not of that character, and in the absence of an express agreement one would be
implied, if necessary, that it shall subst for his use, and it will be so enforced:' Cortra:
Browder & Co. v. Hill, 136 Fed. 821 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905) (requiring an express agreement);
cf. Gore v. Brian, 35 Adt. 897 (N. J. Ch. 1896) (mere understanding not in the nature
of an agreement is insufficient); see Walter Baker & Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.,
162 Fed. 496, 497 (S. D. N. Y. 1903).
3. Ahren v. Freeman, 46 Minn. 156, 4S N. W. 677 (1891) (innocent purchaser for
value without notice); Fears v. Albea, 69 Tex. 437, 6 S. W. 286 (1837) (assignee of
mortgage who in good faith, and without knowledge of the agreement under which the
money was borrowed for the payment of the first mortgage, took assignment after the
discharge of the first of record); see Peoples v. Peoples Bros., 254 Fed. 489, 492 (E. D.
Pa. 1918) ; Makeel v. Hotchkiss, 190 Ill. 311, 320, 60 N. E. 524, 528 (1901) ; Title Guarantee
& Trust Co. v. Haven, 196 N. Y. 437, 495, 89 N. E. 1082, 10S5 (1909); Integrity Trust
Co. v. St. Rita Building & Loan Ass'n, 112 Pa. Super. Ct. 343, 345, 171 Aft. 283, 284 (1934)
("..... right of subrogation. . . will not be enforced where the equities are equal, or the rights
not dear, nor to the prejudice of the legal or equitable rights of others".)
4. In re Rogers Palace Laundry Co., 275 Fed. 829 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921) (right waived
where new and different security was accepted); see Defiance Mach. Works v. Gill, 170
Wis. 477, 483, 175 N. W. 940, 943 (1920).
5. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cincinnati, 291 Fed. 825 (S. D. Ohio 1923); In re
Stinger's Estate, 61 Mont. 173, 201 Pac. 693 (1921); American Surety Co. v. White, 142
Va. 1, 127 S. E. 178 (1925). It requires no citation of authority for the proposition that
the Statutes of Limitations in the various states will bar suits not commenced within the
periods therein provided.
6. In addition, where the right is based on an usurious mortgage subrogation will be
denied. Perkins v. Hall, 105 N. Y. 539, 12 N. E. 48 (1887); Terivilligen v. Beecher, 58
Hun 605, 11 N. Y. Supp. 834 (Sup. Ct., 3d Dep't 1890).
7. Coonrod v. Kelly, 119 Fed. 841 (C. C. A. 3d, 1902); Troyer v. Bank of De Queen,
170 Ark. 703, 281 S. W. 14 (1926) ; Boley v. Daniel, 72 Fla. 121, 72 So. 644 (1916) ; Mather
v. Jenswold, 72 Iowa 550, 32 N. W. 512 (1887) ; Ft. Dodge Bldg. & Loan A-Y'n v. Scott, 86
Iowa 431, 53 N. W. 2S3 (1892).
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existing lienholder to fortuitously advance his lien as the result of the inadvertent
release of a prior lien.8  Furthermore, it is asserted that since an intervening
incumbrancer is not prejudiced if the lender is given priority, as he would be in
exactly the same position if subrogation is granted that he occupied originally, he
should not be heard to complainf It is submitted that the latter rule, announced
in the majority of the cases and applied in the instant case, is the better view. The
right of subrogation, entirely equitable in character, 10 is to be withheld or applied
according to sound judicial discretion under the rule.
The courts in denying subrogation under this majority rule because of superior
equities, waiver or laches have, however, generally stated that culpable negligence
would also preclude relief." The glib use of this last phrase would seem to be
mere verbiage, since it is difficult to conceive what conduct would constitute culpa-
ble negligence, when it has been held that even an omission to procure an assign-
ment of the security released in the face of actual notice would not bar subrogation
where no third party has been prejudiced.12 It is submitted that the rule possesses
sufficient flexibility of application without the inclusion of the confusing and indefin-
ite concept of culpable negligence.
PICKETING-RIGHT TO ENJOIN STRANGERS WHERE No DISPUTE BETWEEN EM-
PLOYER AND EMPLOYEE.-The plaintiff corporation was the operator of an "open
shop" theatre, giving its employees the privilege of joining a union if they so
desired. The defendants, members of labor unions of theatre employees, were
engaged in picketing the plaintiff's theatre. None of the plaintiff's present or former
employees had ever belonged to these unions. The sole purpose of the picketing
was to force unionization of the theatre. On appeal from a decree of the trial
court refusing to issue an injunction, held, that the employer was entitled to in-
junctive relief against picketing by third persons seeking to secure unionization
where non-striking employees were entirely satisfied with their employment. Injunc-
tion granted. Keith Theatre, Inc. v. Vachon, 187 Atl. 692 (Me. 1936).
8. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Bank of Pembroke, 225 Ky. 375, 9 S. W. (2d)
113 (1928); Emmert v. Thompson, 49 Minn. 386, 52 N. W. 31 (1892); Dixon v. Morgan,
154 Tenn. 389, 285 S. W. 558 (1926) ; Hill v. Ritchie, 90 Vt. 318, 98 Atl. 497 (1916). "The
doctrine of constructive notice is resorted to from necessity, its object being to protect
the rights of innocent third persons, and should never be applied in favor of parties not
entitled to the protection it affords." Merchants' & Mechanics' Bank v. Tillman, 106 Ga.
55, 60, 31 S. E. 784, 797 (1898).
9. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Bank of Pembroke, 225 Ky. 375, 381, 9
S. W. (2d) 113, 115 (1928); Dixon v. Morgan, 154 Tenn. 389, 405, 285 S. W. 558, 563
(1926); Hill v. Ritchie, 90 Vt. 318, 322, 98 Atl. 497, 498 (1916).
10. 2 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 1111. See the analogous principle in the law
of quasi contract of unjust enrichment where negligence will not preclude relief. WOOD-
WARD, THE LAW OF QUAsr CONTRACrS (1913) § 15.
11. Stephenson v. Grant, 168 Ark. 927, 271 S. W. 974 (1925); Merchants' & Mechanics'
Bank v. Tillman, 106 Ga. 55, 31 S. E. 794 (1898); Traders' Bank v. Myers, 3 Kan. App.
636, 44 Pac. 292 (1896); Jackson Trust Co. v. Gilkinson, 105 N. J. Eq. 116, 147 Atl. 113
(1929) ; Hill v. Ritchie, 90 Vt. 318, 98 At]. 497 (1916).
12. One can easily understand why there are only one or two cases involving actual
notice since a person with ordinary business acumen would, in the face of actual knowledge,
demand an assignment of the lien which his money is releasing. However, in Wilkins v.
Gibson, 113 Ga. 31, 38 S. E. 374 (1901), a lender, who failed to act upon actual notice, was
held not culpably negligent where no third party was prejudiced.
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The power of a court of equity to restrain the activities of employees in their
struggles with employers has increased steadily with use since its origin at the end
of the last century.1 The generally hostile attitude of the courts as evidenced
by the injunctive limitations which they have placed on labor's chief veapons,
the strike, the boycott and the picket, has been a particular source of grievance to
labor leaders.2 The right to picket has been limited to such an extent that it
has led some writers to conclude it is ineffectual.3 This legal treatment of the
right to picket has made it the storm-center of labor's antipathy to the courts.4
The right to picket has been denied, in some jurisdictions, as illegal per se, either
by statute5 or on the ground that picketing is unlawful because it can never be
peaceful and without some element of intimidation.0 In other jurisdictions, the
right is recognized but limited to the extent that the purpose of picketing must
be justifiable.7 Its broad purpose is to influence the public, the employer or the
employees to such an extent that the employer will be forced to accede to the
demands of the labor union. s When the immediate demand of the labor union
is an increase in wages, the betterment of working conditions or shorter hours, the
direct and obvious benefits to the employees furnish a sufficient legal justification
for the right to picket. 9 However, if the purpose is merely to further the cause
1. The first recorded injunction granted in a labor case was contained in Sherry v.
Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. 307 (1888). See FRxr rER =D Grmam, Tim L o
IwNyNcrio r (1930) app. 1 for a compilation showing frequency of issuance of injunctive
relief against the activities of employees in federal courts.
2. FREY, THE LABOR INJUcMIN (1922) 29; Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act
(1932) 16 Mmn. L. Rav. 638, 657; Comment (1931) 44 HAns. L. Rm. 971; Legis. (1935)
22 VA. L. REv. 83.
3. FREY, Tn:E LABOR J-uNcrio-ON (1922) 29. See Cooper, The Fiction of Peaceful
Picketing (1936) 35 Mzicn. L. Rev. 73, 87.
4. Fraenkel, Recent Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions and Yellow Dog Contracts
(1936) 30 ILL. L. REv. 854, 870; Sayre, Labor and the Courts (1930) 39 YALEn L. J. 622.
For an excellent discussion of the subject, see dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J., in Truax
v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 354 et seq. (1921).
5. ALA. CoD- Ax . (Michie, 1928) § 3448; Nm. Comp. STAT. (1929) §§ 28-812 to
28-814; UTAH Rnv. STAT. A'NY. (1933) §§ 49-2-3 to 49-2-7.
6. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (C. C. S. D. Iowa
1905); Local Union v. Stathakis, 135 Ark. 86, 205 S. W. 450 (1918); Pierce v. Stablemen's
Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909); Franklin Union v. People, 220 Ill 355, 77 N. E.
176 (1906); A. R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union, 232 Ill. 424, 83
N. E. 940 (1908); Beck. v. Railway Teamsters Protective Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77
N. W. 13 (1898). The U. S. Supreme Court has stated that "the name 'picket' implied
a militant purpose, inconsistent with peaceable persuasion." American Steel Foundries
v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 205 (1921).
7. Sarros v. Nouris, 15 Del. Ch. 391, 138 AtL 607 (1927); Fenske Bros., Inc. v.
Upholsterers' International Union, 358 Ill. 239, 193 N. E. 112 (1934); Exchange Bakery
& Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927).
The intentional infliction of injury prnma fade gives rise 'o a cause of action unless
there is sufficient justification. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 204 (1904); Holmes,
Privilege, lalice and Intent (1894) 8 HAnv. L. Rev. 1, 3; Fa-Exnmnm Aw Gnaam, TnE
LABOR INjuO w'rO (1930) 24 et seq.
8. HARPER, ToRTs (1935) 490.
9. Scofes v. Helmar, 205 Ind. 596, 187 N. E. 662 (1933); Exchange Bakery & Res-
19371
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of unionization, the decisions as to whether or not such picketing is justifiable
are in conflict. Under such circumstances, the intimate relationship between the
unions and the' economic welfare of employees has been regarded by some courts
as ground on which to refuse to enjoin picketing.'0 This contention is based on
the theory that the chances of an individual employee to secure favorable terms
and conditions of employment from a powerful business organization will be greatly
enhanced by combination with other employees. 1 On the other hand, some juris-
dictions have held that unionization is too remote to the actual needs of the em-
ployees, inasmuch as it will not directly and immediately result in benefit to the
employees in the form of increased wages, shorter hours or better working con-
ditions. 12 It has also been argued that to permit picketing for the sole purpose of
unionization is against public policy in that it will result in a monopoly of labor
by the unions and the consequent deprivation of the rights of individual non-union
employees to contract for themselves.13
In those jurisdictions which permit picketing, there is a further restriction to
the right for the measures used, may not, in themselves, be tortious.14 As a
consequence, peaceful picketing is permitted but considerable confusion has resulted
from the attempts to define this term.' 5 Some measures used in picketing against
which the courts have issued injunctions are the employment of violence,'0 the
taurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927); Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932).
In some jurisdictions, the privilege of picketing exists only when it is the co'ncomitant
of a strike or of a trade dispute between an employer and his employees. This condition
is imposed on the ground that an unrelated third party should not be permitted to
inflict injury to the property of the employer when his own employees 'are satisfled with
the terms of their employment. Harvey v. Chapman, 226 Mass. 191, 115 N. E. 304
(1917); Gevas v. 'Greek Restaurant Workers' Club, 99 N. J. Eq. 770, 134 At. 309
(1926). This rule was rejected in New York, (see Exchange Bakery 83 Restaurant, Inc.
v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 263, 157 N. E. 130, 132 [1927)) 'and has often been criticiled
(Comment [1933] 33 COL. L. REV. 1188).
10. See Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 505, 57 N. E. 1011, 1016 (1900); Exchange
Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 263, 157 N. E. 130, 132 (1927).
11. This argument was advanced by Holmes, J., in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92,
108, 44 N. E. 1077, 1081 (1896).
12. See Hughes v. Kansas City M. P. M. 0., 282 Mo. 304, 315, 221 S. W. 95, 97
(1920); Moreland Theatres Corp. v. Portland M. P. M. 0. Union, 140 Ore. 35, 47, 12
P. (2d) 333, 338 (1932); Webb v. Cooks', Waiters', & Waitresses' Union, 205 S. W. 465,
468 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
13. See Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 503, 57 N. E. 1011, 1015 (1900); ElkInd &
Sons, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, International Protective Ass'n, 114 N. J. Eq. 586, 591, 169
AtI. 494, 496 (1933); Wasilewski v. Bakers' Union, 118 N. J. Eq. 349, 350, 179 Atd.
284, 285 (1935); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union, 184 Wash. 322, 338, 51
P. (2d) 372, 379 (1935).
14. Lisse v. Local Union No. 31, 2 Cal. (2d) 312, 41 P. (2d) 314 (1935); McMichael
v. Atlantic Envelope Co., 151 Ga. 776, 108 S. E. 226 (1921); F. C. Church Shoe Co.
v. Turner, 218 Mo. App. 516, 279 S. W. 232 (1926); Iverson v. Dilno, 44 Mont. 270,
119 Pac. 719 (1911); Exchange Bakery & 'Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260,
157 N. E. 130 (1927). As a consequence, some jurisdictions prohibit all picketing on
the ground that there is always present an element of intimidation and coercion, and
that picketing cannot be effected peaceably. See note 6, supra.
15. See Cooper, The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing (1936) 35 Micn. L. Rav. 73, 86.
16. McMichael v. Atlanta Envelope Co., 151 Ga. 776, 108 S. E. 226 (1921); Wil-Low
Cafeterias, Inc. v. Kramberg, 134 Misc. 841, 237 N. Y. Supp. 76 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
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use of false or misleading signs,17 the obstruction of the public right of way,18 and
even the mere utterance of words in a loud tone.10 In all these instances, the courts
were of the opinion that the activities amounted to intimidation or coercion of
the employer and were consequently unlawful.
As a result ,f the hampering effects of these decisions on the activities of labor
unions, a number of jurisdictions have passed statutes intended to limit the issuance
of injunctions against picketing.20 But it appears that these statutes, aside from the
correction of previous procedural defects, have only slightly influenced the attitude
of the courts, because of the tendency to construe them as being declaratory of the
common law.
2 1
The court, in the instant case, granted its restraining injunction because the de-
fendants were entirely unrelated to the plaintiff or its employees. The plaintiff's em-
ployees were satisfied with the terms and conditions of their employment. Insofar
as the court limited itself to the facts of the instant case, the decision would seem
to be sound. However, there is language in the case which seems to indicate that the
court might condemn all picketing as intimidating and coercive, regardless of the
relationship between the parties 2 2 An objective view of the problem might indicate
that picketing should be encouraged by the courts as a legitimate means of influencing
public opinion in favor of the employees when the purpose is justifiable, the measures
used not tortious, and there is a privity between the parties. However, where the
picketers are complete strangers to the employer-employee relationship, the court
might well weigh the uncertainty of their success in securing the desired unionization
against the tangible damage to the business of the employer, especially in view
of the fact that the remedy sought is an equitable one.
TAxATIoN-CoNSTrrUTIONALITY OF TAx ON LNcomn Pnoar FOREIGN .REAT Y -
SITUS OF MORTGAGE INTEREST FOR TAXATION Pum'osEs.-The plaintiff, a resident of
New York, received, as beneficiary of a life estate managed and administered under
the laws of New Jersey, certain income, part of which was rent from real estate in
New Jersey, and part, interest on bonds and mortgages upon real property in that
17. Robison v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Local No. 782, 35 Idaho 418, 207
Pac. 132 (1922). If signs are not misrepresentations, they will be permitted. Exchange
Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927).
13. Greenfield v. Central Labor Council, 104 Ore. 236, 207 Pac. 163 (1922). On
the question of mass picketing, see American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades
Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921).
19. Wise Shoe Co. v. Lowenthal, 266 N. Y. 264, 194 N. E. 749 (1935). But see
Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Mach. Co. v. Toohey, 114 Misc. 185, 186 N. Y.
Supp. 95 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
20. For a citation of these statutes, see Cooper, The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing
(1936) 35 MCH. L. Rsv. 73, n. 1.
21. Id. at 76-79. For a discussion of this problem, see Legis. (1935) S Fom nma L.
RPv. 125.
22. "We do not wish to be understood as denying the right of the representatives of
the unions by proper speech and persuasive argument to attempt the conversion of any
employer to their belief that unionization is best; we would not so limit freedom of
speech; but we see a distinction between peaceable persuasion by speech and peaceable
picketing. True, the latter is said not to have in it force or violence, threats, intimi-
dation, or coercion, yet in all picketing there is an element not appearing in fair argument




state, said securities being kept in a New Jersey bank. The plaintiff paid a tax upon
this income in New York under the newly amended Tax Law' and now asks a refund,
claiming that this state had no right to tax such income. The Appellate Division
granted relief to the plaintiff, determining that the identical question presented here
had been decided in a former case,2 and that the amended State Tax Law did not
affect the rule enunciated there, since the basis of that decision had been an in-
fringement of the Federal Constitution, which could not be cured by state legislative
action. The Tax Commission appealed, asserting that such income was taxable under
the personal income tax law. Held, three judges dissenting, that a tax upon rents
from real property located in New Jersey, as well as upon interest from
mortgages on real property within the same state, is taxable income in New York
when received by a resident. Judgment reversed. People ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 271
N. Y. 353, 3 N. E. (2d) 508 (1936).
In reaching the conclusion that a federal income tax on rents from real property
and income from personal property was a "direct" tax within the meaning of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,3 proceeded
on the theory that such a tax on income from property was equivalent to a direct
tax on the property itself. However, subsequent decisions4 of the Court have tended
to lessen the rigor of this decision with regard to personalty, and the majority
opinion, in the instant case, argues against the application of the principle to state
income taxes. Still, should the Pollock Case,5 with all its implications, be controlling
in the Court's treatment of state income taxes, the New York tax on rents from realty
outside this state would not be valid, since a state may only tax land within its
jurisdiction.0
1. N. Y. TAx LAw (Supp. 1936) § 359 reads "gross income includes gains, profits and
income derived from . . . interest, rent (including rent derived from real property situated
outside the state) . . . it being intended to include all of the foregoing items, without
regard to the source thereof, location of property involved or any other factor, except
only a case where inclusion thereof would be violative of constitutional Testrictlons."
2. In Matter of Pierson v. Lynch, 237 App. Div. 763, 263 N. Y. Supp. 259 (3d
Dep't 1933), aff'd, 263 N. Y. 533, 189 N. E. 684 (1933), cert. dismissed, 293 U. S. 52
(1934), it was held that rental from real property located in another state may not be
included by this state as part of owner's income for the purpose of computing her
income tax.
3. 157 U. S. 429 (1895), on rehearing, 158 U. S. 601 (1895).
4. In Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1900) an inheritance tax was declared
not one on property but upon the right to receive it. Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v.
McClain, 192 U. S. 397 (1904) held that a tax on a sugar refining busihess was an excise
tax on the right to carry on such business even though the amount of such tax was
based on income of the company. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911),
decreed that a tax on corporations measured by income was an excise tax upon the
privilege of doing business in the corporate character and not a direct tax upon the
corporation. In Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 17 (1916), Mr.
Justice White, speaking for the Court, said "The Pollock case did not in any degree
involve holding that income taxes generically and necessarily came within the class of
direct taxes on property but on the contrary recognized the fact that taxation on income
was in its nature an excise entitled to be enforced as such. . . ." Maguire v. Trefry, 253
U. S. 12 (1920), permitted a tax, by Massachusetts, upon the income received by a resident
beneficiary from a trust fund located and administered in Pennsylvania. Lawrence v.
State Tax Commissioner, 286 U. S. 276 (1932), declared an income tax to be one based
on domicile and might be taxed as such, regardless of its origin.
5. 157 U. S. 429 (1895), on rehearing, 158 U. S. 601 (1895).
6. See State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 82 U. S. 300, 319 (1873) ; Union Refrigerator
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The tax on the interest from mortgages secured by property in another state
presents a different problem. The Court has not arbitrarily decided that a mortgage,
for taxation purposes, has only one situs, but rather has recognized its dual nature.
It has permitted the state of the mortgagee's domicile to tax the debt secured by a
mortgage upon extra-state realty 7 and the state in which the realty is located to tax
the non-resident mortgagee's interest in the land.8 This is an instance where the
Court has allowed double taxation of the same property. While there is this clash
between the two jurisdictions, the paramount control seems to center in the state
of the creditor's domicile because the debt, not the mortgage, is the principal part of
the chose in action and the income from the mortgage is really compensation for the
loan of money. It would seem, therefore, that the income of the mortgage must be con-
sidered as interest on the debt and since a debt is localized at the domicile of the
creditor,9 New York in the instant case would be permitted to tax such interest from
mortgages. In the dissenting opinion of the case at bar, the contention was made that
the mortgages had attained a "business situs"10 in New Jersey and were therefore
outside New York's jurisdiction. Passing the question of whether casual investment
spells out a "business situs", which is debatable because there is no going business,
still it does not follow that such a tax at the "business situs" excludes the right of
the domicile of the creditor11 to tax the income derived from said "business situs."I
Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 204 (1905); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 263 U. S.
473, 488, 489 (1925); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 92 (1929);
Farmers Loan Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 210 (1929); Senior v. Braden, 29S U. S.
422, 429 (1935).
7. "Nor is the debt, for the purposes of taxation, affected by the fact that it Is
secured by a mortgage upon real estate situated in Illinois. The mortgage is but a
security for the debt. ...The debt then having its situs at the creditor's residence, both
he and it are, for the purposes of taxation, within the jurisdiction of the State." Kirt-
land v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491, 499 (1879).
8. Savings Society v. Multomah County, 169 U. S. 421 (1898), where the Court
held constitutional a state statute which considered the mortgagee's interest in the prop-
erty as realty, for taxation purposes, regardless of his domicile.
9. The Court in determining the situs of a debt, employed the fiction of inobi a
sequunter personain, and in so doing has accepted the domicile of the creditor as the
proper place for the debt to be taxed. State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 82 U. S. 30
(1873); Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491 (1879); Blodgett v. Silverman, 277 U. S.
1 (1927); Farmers Loan Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1929); Baldwin v. Missouri,
281 U. S. 586 (1930); Lowndes, Jwidiction to Tax a Debt, 19 GEo. L.,v J. 427 (1931).
10. The "business situs" theory is based on the supposition that where intangibles
and credits are used in a continuous course of business within a given state, the owner
being without the state, these intangibles attain a situs for taxation within the jurisdiction
in which they are so used. New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309 (1899); Bristol v.
Washington County, 177 U. S. 133 (1900); Board of Assessolrs v. Compton Nat'l, 191 U. S.
388 (1903); Liverpool v. Orleans Assessors, 221 U. S. 346 (1911). "We are not dealing
here with a single creditor or a series of separate Credits but with a busine s. Company
chose to go into business of lending money within Louisiana and employed an agent
to conduct that business. It was conducted under the laws of the state. The state
undertook to tax the capital employed in the business. Under such circumstances they
have a tax situs." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395 (1937);
cf. Deganey v. Lederer, 250 U. S. 376 (1919). For an interesting new development in
the "business situs" theory see Lowndes, The Tax Burden of the Supreme Court i. 1935,
5 FoRanxi L. Rxv. 437 (1936).
11. "But, as we have seen, the jurisdiction of the State of his domicile, over the
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In its decisions having to do with the jurisdictional right to impose an income
tax, the Court has permitted both the state in which the recipient of the income
is domiciled 12 and the state in which the income arises 18 to tax. The basis for the
tax, in the latter case, would seem to be that it was in the nature of an excise tax
upon the privilege of conducting a business within that state and of receiving the
protection of its laws in that business. In Lawrence v. State Tax Commission1 4 the
Court determined that domicile in itself established a basis for imposing an income
tax. Taking this decision at its face value, it appears that an income tax would be
valid regardless of where or from what source the income arose. However, in
Senior v. Braden,15 the Court declared a 'property" tax, measured by income, uncon-
stitutional when imposed upon transferrable trust certificates relating to land outside
of the state. The decision was conditioned upon whether such certificates represented
an interest in the land or were mere choses in action, and the Court found them
to be the former.'6 The implication of the Braden Case is that the Court is giving
more consideration to the source from which the income springs in determining
its taxability. It may be a warning that the Pollock Case17 has been revived and
will present a barrier against the exaction of a tax on income received from realty
not within the state.
By emphasizing the fine distinction which the Court made in the Braden Case18
between a property tax measured by income and an income tax, it is still possible
that the rules of property taxation will not control in the treatment of state income
taxes. But it is not likely that this Court will attempt to withdraw from its position
that double taxation is an undesirable practice,19 even though in the past, it has
declared that dual taxation is not unconstitutional.2 0
creditor's person, does not exclude the power of another State in which he transacts
his business, to lay a tax upon the credits there accruing to him against resident debtors
and thus to enforce contribution for the support of the government under whose pro-
tection his affairs are conducted." Liverpool v. Orleans Assessors, 221 U. S. 346, 356 (1911).
12. Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12 (1920); Lawrence v. State Tax Commissioner,
286 U. S. 276 (1932); cf. Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47 (1924).
13. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920); Travis v. Yale & Towne, 252 U. S. 60
(1920); Underwood v. Chamberlin, 254 U. S. 113 (1920); Atlantic Coast Line v. Daughton,
262 U. S. 413 (1923).
14. 286 U. S. 276 (1932).
15. 295 U. S. 422 (1935).
16. The Court based its whole argument on its decision in Brown v. Fletcher, 235
U. S. 589 (1915). However, in that case, the cestui que trust had a fixed right in the
future to the corpus of the trust.
17. 157 U. S. 429 (1895), on rehearing, 158 U. S. 601 (1895).
18. 295 U. S. 422, 431 (1935).
19. The Court has supported these sentiments against double taxation by a number
of decisions known as the "single tax" cases, upholding one tax to the exclusion of
another. Safe Deposit Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83 (1929); Farmers Loan Co. v.
Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1929); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930); Beidler
v. South Carolina, 282 U. S. 1 (1930); First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312
(1932); Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 421 (1935); Brown, Multiple Taxation by the
States-What is Left of It, 48 HARv. L. Rxv. 407 (1935).
20. Mr. Justice Brandeis disposes of the question in Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand
Forks, 253 U. S. 325, 330 (1920) by saying, "To this it is sufficient to say that the
14th amendment does not prohibit double taxation."
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WILLS-EXECUTION-ComPLrANcE WITH REQUiREMENT THAT WILL BE SIGNED
AT END.-The will in controversy was holographic. The testatrix had folded a sheet
of paper in half, with the fold lying to the left, making in all four pages. The writing
commenced on page one, and was carried over to page four, continuing the sequence
of thought and filling in the entire page. It then continued on the other side of
that page, which would be page three, and followed in unbroken sequence down to
the bottom where the in testimonium clause and date, the signature of testatrib, and
the signature and residences of subscribing witnesses were placed. The validity of
the will was contested on the sole ground that it was not signed at the end as re-
quired by the New York Decedent Estate Law, Section 21. Held, there was a full
compliance with the statute and the will was admitted to probate. In re Murphy,
160 Alisc. 353 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
In the absence of a statute granting the right to devise property, one may not
dispose of it by will or testamentary instrument inasmuch as there is no inherent
or natural right at common law allowing such disposition.' Where the privilege is
granted to the citizens of a state, the sovereign can reserve the right to prescribe
regulations and requirements to which the enjoyment of the right is subject.2 It is
fundamental that the intention of the testator is not to be considered, but solely that
of the legislature, in determining if the testamentary instrument complies with the
statute. The test seems to be, has the devisor conformed with the statute?3
The objective of the statutory requisite, that a will be signed at the end, is to pre-
vent the addition of fraudulent provisions and thus defeat the testamentary intent.4
There are conflicting views as to what constitutes the "end" of a will; the basis of
distinction is the varying degree of importance given form as contrasted with sub-
stance. Those who favor substanceu adopt a "constructive end"; that is, they place
weight upon the fact that signature is found at the "logical, speaking, or intellectual"
1. "The privilege of making a will is not a natural or inherent right, but one which
the state can grant or withhold in its discretion." Matter of Delano, 176 N. Y. 4S6, 491,
68 N. E. 871, 872 (1903), aff'd, 205 U. S. 466 (1907); Leivark v. Dodd, 28S Ill. SO,
123 N. E. 260 (1919). It is a right which is not "inborn" or "fundamental" but is the
result of some "free act," namely that of the state. HoLL%'m, E r.xmts or Ju s-
PRUDNcE (10th ed. 1906) 162.
2. "It is an established principle of law, everywhere -recognized, ... that the dispoaition
of immovable property, whether by deed, descent, or any other mode, is exclusively
subject to the government within whose jurisdiction the property is situated." United States
v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 320 (1876) (thus it was here decreed that the United States, not
being a corporation authorized by New York to take property by devise, could not
acquire land by will); Fisher v. Fisher, 253 N. Y. 260, 170 N. E. 912 (1930); Matter
of Bergdorf, 206 N. Y. 309, 99 N. E. 714 (1912).
3. Failure to observe one or more of the requirements of N. Y. DEc. EsT. Lvw
(1909) § 21 defeats the will, even though an honest attempt to execute it properly is
made. Matter of Conway, 124 N. Y. 455, 26 N. E. 1028 (1891); Matter of Whitney,
153 N. Y. 259, 47 N. E. 272 (1S97); Matter of Andrews, 162 N. Y. 1, 56 N. E. 529 (19LO).
4. N. Y. Dmc. Esa'. L.xw (1909) § 21: "Every last will and testament ...(1) .
shall be subscribed by the testator at the end of the will?' The object of the statute is
"to throw such safeguards around those transactions as will prevent fraud and imposition"
by the addition of clauses. Matter of Booth, 127 N. Y. 109, 116, 27 N. E. 826, 827
(1891).
5. In Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa. 381 (184), under a statute similar to that of Neew
York, the will was written on the first, third, and fourth pages of a folded sheet of
paper. It was signed at the bottom of the third page, the signature being preceded by
"4th see next page." The court held that a will, signed at the end of what was obviously
1937]
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end. Where form is adhered to,0 it is maintained that there is only the "physical
or actual end"; thus requiring consecutive and orderly pagination in all instances.7
The strength of the decision in the case at bar is dependent upon the dicta of
Matter of Field for sustenance.8  The doctrine promulgated there has been con-
strued to modify the strict "physical end" test and to adopt in New York a dual
the "inherent sense," though not at the end in point of space, and where what follows
the signature is expressly and unambiguously referred to in the body, is signed at the
end within the meaning of the statute. The court has applied the rule here in a manner
so literal as to almost exceed advisable limits. But, it is of interest as a precedent.
The rationale of the English doctrine is that where the sequence is coherent, literary,
or logical-or follows in sense, then the end of the will is where the sequence pauses.
This end is called "constructive" as opposed to the "physical or actual" end in paginal
order. 1 JAaR AN, WrLs (6th ed. 1893) 110 note t.
6. In Matter of Andrews, 162 N. Y. 1, 56 N. E. 529 (1900) the will was written
upon blank paper folded so as to make four pages. The first page was filled with
writing; the reverse side of that page was headed "3rd page" and filled with writing,
followed by the in testimonium and attestation clauses. The page at the right was
headed "2nd page" and contained provisions to the bottom of the page. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division in 43 App. Div. 394,
60 N. Y. Supp. 141 (2d Dept. 1899) to the effect that the signature was not at the end
as required by the statute. It would clearly appear that this decision was unjust when
viewed in the light of the purpose behind the statute, inasmuch as the instrument was
left in the possession of the testatrix by the draftsman; this precluded any fraudulent
addition.
7. The real issue is whether, as a matter of law, consecutive pagination is necessary. It
is important to note that the pages are unequivocally numbered. It is said that the
statute is intended to prevent fraud. Matter of Whitney, 153 N. Y. 259, 47 N. E. 272
(1897). Yet where the opportunity for its existence is apparently not present, It would
seem to justify the relaxation of the rule of rigid construction. Despite the fact that
page one and its reverse side constituted a complete will in themselves, viewing the facts
in the whole, the decision produced was inequitable.
In Sears v. Sears, 77 Ohio 104, 82 N. E. 1067 (1907), construing a statute like the one
in New York, the court reviewed with approval the New York Court of Appeals cases,
in handing down its decision.
There are cases in New York which, though cited as "contra" a relaxed application of
the "end" test, may be distinguished on their facts. In Sisters of Charity v. Kelly, 67
N. Y. 409 (1876) the signature was in the body of the instrument with a material portion
of the will following. It was properly concluded by the court that the statute was
not complied with, because it was obvious that there was an opportunity to make
fraudulent additions until the page was entirely covered.
In the Matter of O'Neil, 91 N. Y. 516 (1883) the will was written on a printed
blank which was doubled over. The formal commencement was on page one and It
was signed at the bottom of page three, below the formal termination. A clause was
carried over from page three to page four. The will was read to testator and signed in
the presence of witnesses. The court held that it was not subscribed at the end as
the statute required, and stated at page 524, "There can be no answer to the proposition
that to uphold this will is to defeat the object of the statute. . . . The opportunity of
adding indefinitely to a testamentary provision will be legalized by so holding ... " Matter
of Conway, 124 N. Y. 455, 26 N. E. 1028 (1891)
8. "Form should not be raised above substance in order to destroy a will. . . . The
natural end of a will is where the draftsman stopped writing in the consecutive order of
composition." Matter of Field, 204 N. Y. 448, 457, 97 N. E. 881, 884 (1912).
[Vol. 6
RECENT DECISIONS
standard, namely, that there is a "constructive" end as well as the "physical" end
which may prevail under certain circumstances despite the non-consecutive pagina-
tion.9 There are instances where an iron-clad application of the rule that the
intention of the legislature must prevail would work hardship.10 Denial of probate
may effect a complete annihilation of the testator's intent, as then his property de-
scends according to the laws of descent and distribution.11
While the Court of Appeals has never fully affirmed the effect of the dicta in
Matter of Field, this is only because the question has not since been broached. But
support for the construction upon that decision and dicta by the inferior courts may
be found in at least one jurisdiction which has a similar statute.12 That jurisdiction
has long been committed to the English rule that the end is to be determined by the
"inherent sense" of the instrument. The statute in effect in England until 1852 vas
adopted in New York and is still in effect. But Parliament, cognizant of the unjust
results reached by the English courts under the statute, modified it to read that "the
logical, speaking, or intellectual" test was to be determinative of the "end" within
the meaning of the statute.13 New York has justified the rejection of the present
English rule on the ground that it lacks a basis in the New York statute.'
4 It is
an arbitrary reason.
9. In the Matter of Field, 204 N. Y. 448, 97 N. E. 881 (1912) the will in question
was written on a shoft form blank. At the top was the expression that the testator
devised his properly according to the provisions of the six pages attached which were
numbered from one to six. Immediately thereafter was a blank space on which six
sheets had been attached by two pins. They were numbered one to six, in order, and
written upon one side only. All the provisions of the will were contained therein. Beneath
the six sheets were the signatures of testator and those of the witnesses. The contention
was that the instrument should be read down to the attached sheets, then page one,
and then the signature was to be read. But the court ruled that the natural way to
read the instrument was to commence at the top of the form and continue "with
form and sense reasonably connected" to read the first attached page; next, read through
the remaining pages like a calendar, and then pass on to the signature. The court
admitted that the erroneous contention was supported by previous cases, but distinguished
the immediate case because it was holographic and none of the sx sheets could have
been changed without testator's cooperation.
10. See Matter of Andrews, 43 App. Div. 394, 401, 60 N. Y. Supp. 141, 147 (2d Dep't
1899), where judge Cullen said: "... it must be conceded that as to this supposed danger
(fraudulent additions) the remedy has proved in practice far worse than the disease."
He proceeded to hand down a decision denying the validity of the will only because
he wasbound by the rule as laid down by Matter of Conway, 124 N. Y. 455, 26 N. E.
1028 (1891), cited note 3, supra.
11. N. Y. Dma. Esr. LAw (1929) § 81. It provides that both the personal and real
property of a person who dies without devising it shall descend to his lineal descendants,
father, mother, and collateral relatives. And an invalid will, being a nonentity for all
legal purposes, the rules of descent will apply.
12. PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 20, § 191. "... every will shall be signed at the
end thereof... ." Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa. 381 (1884), cited note 5, supra.
13. Matter of Andrews, 162 N. Y. 1, 8, 56 N. E. 529, 531 (1900), cited note 3, upra:
"Our present Statute of Wills, requiring that a will should be subscribed at the end
thereof is similar to 1 Victoria, ch. 26.... Prior to this amendment, the courts construed
the act as stridtly as our own have the present Statute of Wills. (Wills v. Lowe, 5
Notes of Cases, 428; ... Smee v. Bryer, 6 Moore's P. C. Cases, 404) .... "
14. "Clearly it needs no other argument than is furnished by a statement of the
practice in England respecting the probate of wills prior to 1838, and a reading of the
19371
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It would not be too uncertain, in view of the facts presented, to conclude that
the decisions 15 of the Surrogates' Courts construe Matter of Field in its proper light.
But an appropriate opinion by the highest tribunal of the State or legislation such as
was enacted in England should be forthcoming. Either would achieve the certainty
desired.
WILLS-LBEL-DELETION OF DEFAMATORY MATTER IN WILL.-The petitioner,
executor of an estate, propounded a will for probate. With the consent of all parties
interested, he requested the Surrogate to delete from the will certain objectionable
language included by the testatrix as an explanation of her refusal to give one of
her devisees a greater part of the estate. Held, the defamatory matter will be ex-
cluded and the will admitted to probate. In re Draske's Will, 290 N. Y. Supp. 581
(Surr. Ct. 1936).
There are few recorded instances in which the English prerogative or probate
courts have been called upon to inquire into their power to exclude from probate and
record defamatory matter contained in a will. Although the earlier courts expressed
some doubt of their power, despite the consent of all interested parties, to delete
such matter from a will,' or from the probate copy,2 apparently their power to
delete objectionable language from the probate copy is no longer questioned.a The
exercise of the power, moreover, has not been limited to libelous statements but has
extended to the exclusion of any matter, the disclosure of which by probate and record
would contravene public policy. 4
In this country, the exact question has been treated only in New York; in no in-
stance has the problem been decided by an appellate court.5 No little difficulty has
been encountered by the courts because of the mandatory language of the statute0
amendment of 1852, to demonstrate the inapplicability of English decisions to a question
like that before us." Matter of Conway, 124 N. Y. 455, 462, 26 N. E. 1028, 1030 (1891).
15. Ma'tter of Peiser, 79 Misc. 668, 140 N. Y. Supp. 844 (Surr. Ct. 1913); In re
Rowe's Will, 159 N. Y. Supp. 615 (Surr. Ct. 1916).
1. Curtis v. Curtis, 3 Addams 33, 162 Eng. Reprints 393 (Prerog. 1825) ("cruel and
murderous conduct of my wife").
2. Goods of Wartnaby, 1 Rob. Eccl. 423, 163 Eng. Reprints 1088 (Prerog. 1846);
Ma'rsh v. Marsh, 1 Swa. & Tr. 528, 164 Eng. Reprints 845 (Prob. 1860).
3. Estate of White [1914] P. 153 (defamatory matter concerning testator's wife stricken
from the probate copy), (1915) 63 U. oF PA. L. REV. 581; Estate of Cale, 43 T. L. R.
697 (1927) (highly defamatory words stricken from probate) ; In re Maxwell, 140 L. T. R.
471 (1929) (court would not physically remove objectionable matter from the will,
but struck it from probate).
4. Estate of Heywood, 114 T. L. R. 375 (1915) (military secrets expunged from a
testamentary letter made by a soldier at the front).
5. There are only three decisions to be found in New York: In re Bomar's Will, 44
N. Y. S. R. 304, 18 N. Y. Supp. 566 (Surr. Ct. 1892); Matter of Meyer, .72 Misc. 567,
131 N. Y. Supp. 27 (Surr. Ct. 1911); Matter of Speiden, 128 Misc. 899, 221 N. Y.
Supp. 223 (Surr. Ct. 1926).
6. N. Y. SuiRR. CT. Acr (1930) § 144 subd. 2- "If it appears to the Surrogate that
the will was duly executed, and that the testator at the time of executing it, was in
all respects competent to make a will and no't under restraint; it must be admitted to
probate as a will valid to pass real property, or personal property, or both as the




which requires the Surrogate to admit a will to probate upon satisfactory proof that
it was duly executed and the testator was competent at the time of e-xecution.7 The
court, in the instant case, states that justification for an excision has been made on
the ground that the will which must be admitted consists only of the affirmative
expression of the testator's intent;8 other matter not necessary or operative is legally
nugatory and need not be admitted to probate.0
Whatever authority the Surrogate may possess to delete defamatory matter from
a will, it seems established that a court of probate will not exercise its power to strike
out mere expressions of strong feeling, such as the utterances of a disappointed
litigant, which are not grave enough to be harmful.10
Where the objectionable matter is dispositive or administrative,"' non-dispositive
but probative,-2 or permeates the whole will,13 the courts will, apparently, be power-
less to strike it out; excision under such circumstances would be destructive of the
testator's intent, the effectuation of which has been the foremost consideration of the
courts.1 4 Any attempt to elide would result in an arbitrary rewriting of the will by
the courts.
7. A will fulfilling statutory requirements must be admitted to probate regalrdle: of
the invalidity of any or all its provisions. Matter of Webb, 122 Misc. 129, 202 N. Y.
Supp. 346 (Surr. Ct. 1923), affd, 203 App. Div. 793, 203 N. Y. Supp. 958 (Ist Dep't 1924) ;
In re Lawler's Estate, 123 Misc. 72, 205 N. Y. Supp. 271 (Surr. Ct. 1924) "Any other
rule would lead to confusion and to the introduction of false issues in the probate of
wils." Vann, J., Matter of Davis, 182 N. Y. 468, 476, 75 N. E. 530, 533 (1905). See
also Cartwright v. Cartwright, 158 Ark. 278, 281, 250 S. W. 11, 13 (1923); In re
Tinsley's Will, 187 Iowa 23, 174 N. W. 4, 6 (1919).
S. In re Draske's Will 290 N. Y. Supp. 581, 591 (Surr. Ct. 1936) citing S BAco;, OF
Wres AND TEsTrxmrars 479. Blackstone defines a will as '"the legal declaration of a
man's intentions, which he wills to be performed after his death." 2 Bx. Co=mi. 499 (9th
ed. 1783).
9. But see Matter of Meyer's Will, 72 Misc. 566, 131 N. Y. Supp. 27 (Surr. Ct. 1911).
10. Goods of Honywood, L. R. 2 P. & D. 251 (1871) (the matter which the court
refused to strike contained expressions such as, "Robbed me of my birthright," "terrible
iniquity," "wicked, remorseless," "deliberately and designedly defraud"); Estate of Cale,
43 T. L. R. 697 (1927); (exhortations to testator's children). See Schecker v. Wookey,
2 App. Div. 52, 54, 37 N. Y. Supp. 292, 293 (2d Dept. 1896); Marsh v. Marsh, 1 Sw.
and Tr., 528, 536, 164 Eng. Reprints 845, 849 (Prob. 1860).
11. See In re Bomar's Will, 44 N. Y. S. R. 304, 305, 306, 18 N. Y. Supp. 214, 215 (Surr.
Ct. 1892); Matter of Speiden, 128 Misc. 899, 901, 221 N. Y. Supp. 223, 224 (Surr. Ct.
1926) (any matter which does not constitute an operative portion of instrument may be
stricken); 1 P.AE, WIs (2d ed. 1928) § 527.
12. It has been suggested that immaterial matter may not be dispositive yet it may be
probative, as in the appointment of a guardian by will as provided by statute, N. Y. Dom.
REL. LmW. (1935) § 81. See Matter of Meyer, 72 Misc. 567, 572, 131 N. Y. Supp. 27, 32
(Surr. Ct. 1911).
13. Such a situation is suggested in the case of "'the notorious libertine (who)
maliciously gave legacies in alleged compensation to certain ladies who bad repulsed his
advances.' Suppose the libertine had, in the same formal document, bequeathed nominal
sums 'o other ladies, not kin of his, without further explanation. Any attempt to elide
matter from such an instrument would destroy it beyond recognition." Freifield, Libel
by Will (1933) 19 A. B. A. 3. 301, 302.
14. "The first and great rule in the exposition of wills, to which all other rules must
bend, is, that the intention of the testator, expressed in his will, shall prevail, provided it
be consistent with the rules of law." Marshall, C. J., in Smith v. Bell, 31 U. S. 63, 74
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In those instances wherein the courts would be able to expunge the objectionable
phrases from the will without changing its effect, the action may serve a twofold
purpose: the deletion of the libel from the will is the more satisfactory remedy
available to the person defamed;15 where the testamentary libel has already been
published, the deletion will serve to mitigate the damages obtainable in an action
against the estate. 16
It is fortunate that cases of testamentary libel are rare, and that the Surrogates
Courts have so effectively, in many cases, prevented a will from becomihg a vehicle
of contumely and libel. The result has been obtained in New York, by a judicious
exercise of incidental powers, which although not expressly granted by statute, are
absolutely essential to the administration of the estates of deceased persons. 17
(1832); Grove v. Willard, 280 Ill. 247, 117 N. E. 489 (1917); North Adams Nat. Bank v.
Curtis, 284 Mass. 330, 187 N. E. 546 (1933); In re Martin's Will, 255 N. Y. 248, 174 N. E.
643 (1931).
15. The will is a permanent court record which will be perused actually by some and
constructively by many. See Freifield, Libel by Will (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 301, 302.
16. Recovery has been permitted against the estate for testamentary libel. Gallagher's
Estate, 10 D. & C. 733 (Pa. 1900); Harriss v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W.
584 (1914) (executor is agent of testator for publication of libel); cf. Citizens' & Southern
Nat. Bank v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S. E. 213, 87 A. L. R. 235 (1933). Contra.
Nagle v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 472, 175 AtI. 487 (1934) (matter contained in a will offered for
probate is privileged). See Comment (1935) 4 FoRin: L. REv. 349.
A recent amendment of N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW (1935) § 118 provides for the survival of
personal actions without exception. See In re Payne's Estate, 290 N. Y. Supp. 407, 415
(Surr. Ct. 1936).
17. In 1830 the New York legislature provided "that no Surrogate shall under pretext
of incidental or constructive authority, exercise any jurisdiction whatever not expressly
given by some statute of this state." 2 R. S. 221 § 1. The statute was repealed by c. 460
Laws 1837, for as was said by Chancellor Walsworth, " ... the exercise of certain incidental
powers by the courts was absolutely essential to the true administration of justice . . . and
the legislature had not by their care and foresight, been able to take the case of the
Surrogates Courts out of the operations of the general rule." Pew v. Hastings, 1 Barb.
Ch. 452, 454 (N. Y. 1846).
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